Comparing the Vietnam War of 1957 to 1975 with the ACW

[Kirk's Raider's]

There is a school of thought that at the end of the Vietnam War that argued that the Confederacy could of won the ACW had the Confederacy in essence fought the ACW the same way as the North Vietnamese.
I would argue that school of thought is quite wrong because while the Vietnam War was a Civil War it was extremely different from the ACW.
Kirk's Raider's

 

[Kirk's Raider's]

One huge difference between the war is that both the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese were both diplomatically recognized nations unlike the Confederacy which never received diplomatic recognition.
Both nations received not just arms sales but military and from other nations.
For example the North Vietnamese simply received Soviet aircraft and anti air craft missiles they didn't have to buy them.
Also the Soviet Union and other nations sent advisors to North Vietnam.
Communist China per David Hablestram (sp?) " John Paul Van a bright and shining Lue" sent 100k troops to man anti aircraft guns in North Vietnam.
Kirk's Raider's

 

[Kirk's Raider's]

South Vietnam received massive economic and military aid from the United States.
In addition the following nations sent troops to South Vietnam
1.United States
2.Australia
3.New Zealand
4.South Korea
5.Thailand
6.Taiwan
7. The Philippines.
Kirk's Raider's

 

[Carmel]

I think there is something to the argument that the South could have won using Hanoi's tactics, given how much weaker the army was at the outset of the Civil War compared to the Vietnam War.

The United States Military at the beginning of the Civil War was small and somewhat amateurish compared to the military machines that some European countries had at the time. The best known tactics and strategies were European; cadets had to learn French at West Point in order to read the books, and George McClellan had spent time as an observer during the Crimean War in order to learn. Some of the men who would be most instrumental in winning the war (i.e. Grant, Sherman) were not even in the army. The army was filled with political generals, and there was a fair amount of bumbling, trial and error as less competent generals got weeded out. Tactics had not caught up to the innovations in firearms (the Minie ball), nor had medicine. The home front was painfully divided, with strong and influential influences against flighting the war, particularly in the border states. If a guerilla war had been waged against this army before it evolved into the larger, more organized force that it became by the end, I believe that the morale of the Northern public would have eroded pretty quickly, and the domestic pressure to get out would have been much greater than it already was, perhaps tipping it for good.

Contrast that to the United States Army at the outset of the Vietnam War. It was arguably the strongest, most sophisticated on the planet, with many of the officers instrumental in the World War II victories still active (or President.) American military manuals were standard in military academies around the world. While Eisenhower had the wisdom not to get involved when presented with the optioon in 1954, understanding well the risks, Kennedy and Johnson were more easily swayed, since their military experience was superficial. The Armed Forces were confident and had the technology, and probably could have won any war that it fought wholeheartedly. What they lacked was a good reason to be there. Worry about public opinion made Kennedy very cautious and Johnson susceptible to overconfident advice. It was domestic public opinion, learning of the horrors of the war, that was the main reason the country got out of the war.

Imagine the same domestic pressure during a time when the United States was much more divided and the people being attacked were fellow countrymen and women.

 

[Kirk's Raider's]

I think there is something to the argument that the South could have won using Hanoi's tactics, given how much weaker the army was at the outset of the Civil War compared to the Vietnam War.

The United States Military at the beginning of the Civil War was small and somewhat amateurish compared to the military machines that some European countries had at the time. The best known tactics and strategies were European; cadets had to learn French at West Point in order to read the books, and George McClellan had spent time as an observer during the Crimean War in order to learn. Some of the men who would be most instrumental in winning the war (i.e. Grant, Sherman) were not even in the army. The army was filled with political generals, and there was a fair amount of bumbling, trial and error as less competent generals got weeded out. Tactics had not caught up to the innovations in firearms (the Minie ball), nor had medicine. The home front was painfully divided, with strong and influential influences against flighting the war, particularly in the border states. If a guerilla war had been waged against this army before it evolved into the larger, more organized force that it became by the end, I believe that the morale of the Northern public would have eroded pretty quickly, and the domestic pressure to get out would have been much greater than it already was, perhaps tipping it for good.

Contrast that to the United States Army at the outset of the Vietnam War. It was arguably the strongest, most sophisticated on the planet, with many of the officers instrumental in the World War II victories still active (or President.) American military manuals were standard in military academies around the world. While Eisenhower had the wisdom not to get involved when presented with the optioon in 1954, understanding well the risks, Kennedy and Johnson were more easily swayed, since their military experience was superficial. The Armed Forces were confident and had the technology, and probably could have won any war that it fought wholeheartedly. What they lacked was a good reason to be there. Worry about public opinion made Kennedy very cautious and Johnson susceptible to overconfident advice. It was domestic public opinion, learning of the horrors of the war, that was the main reason the country got out of the war.

Imagine the same domestic pressure during a time when the United States was much more divided and the people being attacked were fellow countrymen and women.

It is quite correct that both the United States Army as well as the allied armies had extensive recent experience in the last twenty years fighting in WW2 and Korea. The Australian Army also fought in the Maylay Insurgency as well.
The North Vietnamese Army and the National Liberation Front (NLF) had extensive experience fighting both the Japanese and the French. The Filipino Army in addition to fighting in WW2 and Korea also fought in an extensive counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines.
Kirk's Raider's

 

[Kirk's Raider's]

I think there is something to the argument that the South could have won using Hanoi's tactics, given how much weaker the army was at the outset of the Civil War compared to the Vietnam War.

The United States Military at the beginning of the Civil War was small and somewhat amateurish compared to the military machines that some European countries had at the time. The best known tactics and strategies were European; cadets had to learn French at West Point in order to read the books, and George McClellan had spent time as an observer during the Crimean War in order to learn. Some of the men who would be most instrumental in winning the war (i.e. Grant, Sherman) were not even in the army. The army was filled with political generals, and there was a fair amount of bumbling, trial and error as less competent generals got weeded out. Tactics had not caught up to the innovations in firearms (the Minie ball), nor had medicine. The home front was painfully divided, with strong and influential influences against flighting the war, particularly in the border states. If a guerilla war had been waged against this army before it evolved into the larger, more organized force that it became by the end, I believe that the morale of the Northern public would have eroded pretty quickly, and the domestic pressure to get out would have been much greater than it already was, perhaps tipping it for good.

Contrast that to the United States Army at the outset of the Vietnam War. It was arguably the strongest, most sophisticated on the planet, with many of the officers instrumental in the World War II victories still active (or President.) American military manuals were standard in military academies around the world. While Eisenhower had the wisdom not to get involved when presented with the optioon in 1954, understanding well the risks, Kennedy and Johnson were more easily swayed, since their military experience was superficial. The Armed Forces were confident and had the technology, and probably could have won any war that it fought wholeheartedly. What they lacked was a good reason to be there. Worry about public opinion made Kennedy very cautious and Johnson susceptible to overconfident advice. It was domestic public opinion, learning of the horrors of the war, that was the main reason the country got out of the war.

Imagine the same domestic pressure during a time when the United States was much more divided and the people being attacked were fellow countrymen and women.

A guerrilla war early in the ACW would of been a terrible decision by the Confederacy. The whole reason for secession was to preserve and expand slavery. An exclusive guerrilla warfare strategy allows the Union to seize all the major cities and ports thus the Confederacy collapses. With the end of slavery the Union now can utilize black counterinsurgency forces who won't hesitate to retaliate against Confederate Civilians.
Kirk's Raider's