Forrest must have been a superman.Sherman himself said it was worth sacrificing 10k Union troops to kill Forrest.
Kirk's Raider's
Forrest must have been a superman.Sherman himself said it was worth sacrificing 10k Union troops to kill Forrest.
Kirk's Raider's
Are you familiar with Brice’s Crossroads.I can not believe their not a Nathan Forrest Thread on this forum... I will start one... I am a Forrest Hater so everyone understands where I stand. We will start with a battle Forrest lost The battle of Tupelo...
A general overview... https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/tupelo
Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith, commanding a combined force of more than 14,000 men, left LaGrange, Tennessee, on July 5, 1864, and advanced south. Smith’s mission was to insure that Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest and his cavalry did not raid Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s railroad lifeline in Middle Tennessee and, thereby, prevent supplies from reaching him in his campaign against Atlanta. Laying waste to the countryside as he advanced, Smith reached Pontotoc, Mississippi, on July 11. Forrest was in nearby Okolona with about 6,000 men, but his commander, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, told him he could not attack until he was reinforced. Two days later, Smith, fearing an ambush, moved east toward Tupelo. On the previous day, Lee arrived near Pontotoc with 2,000 additional men and, under his command, the entire Confederate force engaged Smith. Within two miles of the Federals, on the night of the 13th, Lee ordered an attack for the next morning. Lee attacked at 7:30 am the next morning in a number of uncoordinated assaults which the Yankees beat back, causing heavy casualties. Lee halted the fighting after a few hours. Short on rations, Smith did not pursue but started back to Memphis on the 15th. Criticized for not destroying Forrest’s command, Smith had caused much damage and had fulfilled his mission of insuring Sherman’s supply lines.
Here are some details.... from a book review... https://cwba.blogspot.com/2015/01/parson-work-for-giants-campaign-and.html
The author effectively deflects the common view among Forrest partisans that Tupelo was S.D. Lee's fight and Forrest thus cannot be held responsible for the defeat and heavy (more than 2-to-1) casualties suffered. While it is true that Lee as senior officer would direct any battle when present on the field, Forrest uncharacteristically declined Lee's offer to grant field command to Forrest. As he had demonstrated on many other occasions during the war, Forrest was a poor subordinate at Tupelo, conducting his corps commander duties in a passive manner then suddenly changing the battle plan without informing his superior. The resulting battle was an uncoordinated collection of brigade sized assaults, none of which were remotely successful3. Lee hardly covered himself in glory either, his gross mismanagement of the battle seemingly overlooked by the Confederate high command before they transferred him to corps command in the Army of Tennessee.
The final section offers brief rundowns (a couple pages or so each) of the most enduring controversies surrounding the Tupelo campaign and battle, with Parson assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their historiographical underpinnings and offering his own conclusions based upon the evidence. Most are touched upon to some degree elsewhere in the book but the chapter deals with many of the myths and legends at greater depth than before. Common themes also emerge, one of the most prominent being the attempt by Forrest friends and ex-subordinates to disassociate their hero from any great responsibility for the defeat. Another involves minimizing the impact of the tactical Union victory at Tupelo by painting the operation as a strategic defeat (i.e. emphasizing A.J. Smith's retreat to Tennessee the day after the battle and crediting Confederate forces for holding the field and saving an objective — the Black Prairie breadbasket — never actually targeted by Smith's force). Though supported by evidence, some of Parson's arguments have lesser impact. For instance, with so many Civil War leaders conveniently citing lack of food and ammunition as an excuse for retreat, Parson comes across as overly dismissive of Smith critics who might justifiably be skeptical of yet another general employing the same line of reasoning.
My point is Forrest is nothing than a product of Southern PR... I follow his own orders and his friends covered for him...
Hello L.C.Forrest must have been a superman.
Hello!Hello L.C.
But, I never recall him wearing... a cape or flyin'. Do you have any evidence that he was born on Krypton?
Just don't "spit" into the wind, or tug on that cape.Hello!
It was directed primarily toward Kirk’s Raider’s. I believe a shadow of his former self once discussed a similar thing on that “other site.”
In a sense he was since obviously Sherman for valid reasons considered Forrest as a major threat. Obviously General Smith in a sense discovered the proper remedy to Forrest and that was to outnumber Forrest with cavalry troopers armed with repeater's. Some of my friends such has CSA Today on CWT might say that Wilson didn't play fair but it wasn't Wilson's job to offer Forrest a fair and sporting fight.Forrest must have been a superman.
The nature of war is insufficient information. Good leaders account for that, but sometimes they just miss an opportunity.Smith withdrew due to lack of ammo and bad rations - Forrest failed to pursue him, and that was his specialty. It would have been interesting indeed if Forrest had done that and caught up with Smith!
I book I reference did not mention any illness but pointed out Forrest made a poor subordinated at other times as well...Given this state of health, Forrest declined to command the battle of Tupelo. He told Lee he did not believe it was a sound plan, that the Federals were too strong and things looked against them. Also, he and Morton had a good tactic of bunching together artillery for a concentrated blasting - this was very effective. Lee insisted on dispersing a battery to each brigade. Forrest did indeed change plans in the middle of the battle - which again was not characteristic of him - and he held back Roddey after seeing what happened to the Kentuckians. He did not want to waste the lives of his men without benefit. Then he got shot! But the two commanders were tripping over each other. Bad communication.
You say Forrest should have pursued Smith... but history says Smith could have destroyed Forrest...Another mistake Forrest made that was not characteristic, was failing to scent blood in the water. Smith withdrew due to lack of ammo and bad rations - Forrest failed to pursue him, and that was his specialty. It would have been interesting indeed if Forrest had done that and caught up with Smith!
IMHO this evidence does not support your proposition. Criticized for not destroying Forrest is not the same as being able to.You say Forrest should have pursued Smith... but history says Smith could have destroyed Forrest...
LINK: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/tupelo
Lee attacked at 7:30 am on the 14th in a number of uncoordinated assaults which the Yankees beat back, causing heavy casualties. Lee halted the fighting after a few hours. Short on rations, Smith did not pursue but started back to Memphis on the 15th. Criticized for not destroying Forrest’s command, Smith had however caused much damage and had fulfilled his mission of insuring the safety of Sherman’s supply lines.
Forrest's most reliable scout, his brother Bill, was about 100 miles to the north near the Tennessee border. Forrest was contesting the prairies - a breadbasket battle - and these were ones Forrest should have excelled at. He also failed to flank the Union when he had an opportunity, and that was his favorite move. "Hit 'em on the end!"The nature of war is insufficient information. Good leaders account for that, but sometimes they just miss an opportunity.
Yes, Smith could have destroyed Forrest's command but Pyrrhic victories were not viable for him! Forrest was perfectly capable of taking Smith with him, too, for that matter. Sherman, however, was being Sherman - he was nervous as a cat about Forrest, had nightmares over him lighting on him with his customary speed and efficiency...he failed to recognize that Smith had done his job just as effectively as if he had destroyed Forrest. Tupelo is a substantial part of why Bragg sent Wheeler after Sherman. Wheeler...Sherman breathed a sigh of relief - this guy would be nothing more than a chronic crick in the neck. (And he basically was...)You say Forrest should have pursued Smith... but history says Smith could have destroyed Forrest...
LINK: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/tupelo
Lee attacked at 7:30 am on the 14th in a number of uncoordinated assaults which the Yankees beat back, causing heavy casualties. Lee halted the fighting after a few hours. Short on rations, Smith did not pursue but started back to Memphis on the 15th. Criticized for not destroying Forrest’s command, Smith had however caused much damage and had fulfilled his mission of insuring the safety of Sherman’s supply lines.
Here I found this more detailed looked at his illness after Brice crossroads... He was wore out and he was suffering from Boils... at the battle of Tupelo he was shot in the foot which forced him into a buggy to be carted around. Him being shot and exhausted is why he did not preform well at Tupelo... He ask to take leave after the battle and was denied...Forrest fainted twice and fell off his horse unconscious.
Yes, I think Forrest's health was a critical factor in his well and truly messing up that day. He had stumbled over bad commanders before, and fought battles he didn't want to fight - but Tupelo stands alone as his worst battle. Forrest was not beat like a rug often and Tupelo stands alone until Wilson did the job once and for all at Selma.I book I reference did not mention any illness but pointed out Forrest made a poor subordinated at other times as well...
The author effectively deflects the common view among Forrest partisans that Tupelo was S.D. Lee's fight and Forrest thus cannot be held responsible for the defeat and heavy (more than 2-to-1) casualties suffered. While it is true that Lee as senior officer would direct any battle when present on the field, Forrest uncharacteristically declined Lee's offer to grant field command to Forrest. As he had demonstrated on many other occasions during the war, Forrest was a poor subordinate at Tupelo, conducting his corps commander duties in a passive manner then suddenly changing the battle plan without informing his superior. The resulting battle was an uncoordinated collection of brigade sized assaults, none of which were remotely successful3. Lee hardly covered himself in glory either, his gross mismanagement of the battle seemingly overlooked by the Confederate high command before they transferred him to corps command in the Army of Tennessee.
Hummm ... We have not got to Wilson yet....Wilson did the job once and for all at Selma.
Indeed so! Wilson and Forrest became very good friends after the war - no hard feelings! At the beginning the Southern horsemen really had the upper hand - just like Brandy Station showed Stuart's Black Horse could be beaten, Tupelo showed Forrest could be beaten.Hummm ... We have not got to Wilson yet....