seems to be working ok, are you using an out of date link?.
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States Rights Gist, must take first place surely!
Your Surviving the War was Better under Grant... then Lee
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States Rights Gist, must take first place surely!
5fish
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I am older than you, sonny... and prettier.... lol ... read my links; you get your answers...
It may be helpful to put these numbers in perspective by comparing them to the casualty figures for the Army of Northern Virginia under Lee’s command and to those for other Confederate commanders. Incomplete figures show that Lee, in his major campaigns and battles, commanded a cumulative total of 598,178 soldiers, of whom 121,042 were either killed or wounded—a total loss of 20.2 percent, about one-third higher than Grant. Other major Confederate commanders with higher percentages killed or wounded than Grant were Generals Braxton Bragg (19.5 percent), John Bell Hood (19.2 percent), and Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard (16.1 percent).
5fish
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You can read my links and get your answers ...
Writing in 1898, Charles Dana, Assistant Secretary of War during the Civil War, analyzed this facet of Grant’s Overland Campaign: “There are still many persons who bitterly accuse Grant of butchery in this campaign. As a matter of fact, Grant’s war strategy lost fewer men in his successful effort to take Richmond and end the war than his predecessors lost in making the same attempt and failing.” Dana examined the specific casualties suffered by Union troops in the East under Grant’s predecessors and then under Grant. Under Generals McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade, the Union’s eastern armies, according to Dana’s table of statistics, had 15,745 killed, 76,079 wounded, and 52,101 missing or captured for a total of 143,925 casualties between May 24, 1861, and May 4, 1864. He then calculated Grant’s losses between May 5, 1864, and April 9, 1865, as 15,139 killed, 77,748 wounded, and 31,503 missing or captured for a total of 124,390. Dana concluded that these numbers showed that “Grant in eleven months secured the prize with less loss than his predecessors suffered in failing to win it during a struggle of three years.”
5fish
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You can argue with the facts all you want; so go attack the windmills, Don Quixote...
You have plagarised this site https://www.historyonthenet.com/getting-to-know-general-grant
this website only uses incomple data from Attack and Die, using ( 12) major field battles, Lee having command of c598k, under half his actual number he commanded, and only 42% of the casulaties he suffererd, while i used data from every engagemnt lee fought, where he commanded and so got a more acurate value.
But lets look at attack and die. Lees 12 major Battles from table 4, 598,178 soldiers, of whom 121,042 were either killed or wounde a total loss of 20.2 percent, but he was aoutnumbered by 1.5 to one in those battles, so the casulaty rate show be 1.5 that of the force with that manpower advantage, in its ability to inflict losses at the sme ratio it has in manpower advntage. Which means it is expected to inflict 196951 casulaties but has unerperformed, and only inlificted 121,042. this isa CEV of .8 ( or 20% underachivement in expected oucome. (they all needed 10 men to do the job of 8) lee on the otoh, being outnmumberd by the same ratio of 1.5 to on against has inflicted more than he is expected to and achievesa CEV of 1.1, or he has overachieved by 10%, or 10 men do the job of 11 men, difference between lee and grant is therefore 30% in expected outcome, thats the difference between lee who only needs 7 men to do the job of Grants 10 men, at causing combat losses.
maths is a great way to understand things, shame its beyond you to do so.
You dont understand your own links.
Grant was willing to let his own men die, when he had it in his power to save them, in pursuit of his attrition campaign.
Charles A. Dana, U.S. Assistant Secretary of War, said after the war, "We think after the testimony given that the Confederate authorities and especially Mr. Davis (President Jefferson Davis) ought not to be held responsible for the terrible privations, suffering, and injuries which our men had to endure while kept in Confederate Military Prisons; the fact is unquestionable that while Confederates desired to exchange prisoners, to send our men home, and to get back their own men, General Grant steadily and strenuously resisted such an exchange."
ok lets look at Dana ( who did not know modern war are a process not settled by a single event, that takes time ) numbers. 91824 KIA/Wia till May of 64. 92887 of same from then till April of 65. leaving aside these numbers have long been replaced by more accurate one by the US War Department,
Pre Grant 1067/91824 is 86 a day lost. Grant in 64, by same 235 men lost, or you were 2.7 times more likely to become a casualty under Grants leadership than any one else.
Attack and Die has Less casualties for the same time period, when Grant came at him 40546 in 304 days, is 133 a day. or in general terms despite having between 2.1 to 2.7 more men, Grants men were nearly twice as likely to become a casualty than inflict one, before then,Lee was losing 80496/1067 75 men a day, or in other words he obtained 75 to 86 against all comers till Grant showed up and he went into overdrive, at casualty inflicting, and became 133 to 235.
Your own authors numbers show the facts, you just too thick to see it.
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Grant was under political pressure to end the war before the election, hence the massive increase in Union casualties that the AoP have never before seen. Grant told POTUS he would need 200k more men to replace those he expected to lose to win by the election, Grant "The carnage was was be confined to a singe year to achieve at that was anticipated or desired"
Mackubin T. Owens, USN War College
"Grant, on the other hand, has been described as a "butcher. According to the conventional wisdom, Grant lacked strategic sense and tactical competence and was able to achieve victory only by taking advantage of the manpower and material superiority of the Union to bludgeon his opponent into submission."
Lincoln
"To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his entrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it, that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it."
And yet that all that grant achieved , the very opposite of lincolsn desire.
Grant cautioned the government that the cost of Overland would be and additional 100,000 casualties, ( he was off as he suffered 127,000 in the next 12 months, excluding sick l;osses) which was why he wanted 200k+ to go South with, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=chi.19958599&view=1up&seq=391. More than had been incurred since the war had began would now come about in 6 weeks he thought, from an AoP that would be the biggest it ever had been allowed to be, nearly twice what Mac was allowed to do the same job, who got to the S Side of Richmond without a loss of life.
US Grant explaining his use of attrition.
"I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy...Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land. These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole county."
As for a military education
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll3/id/1523/rec/50
"Grant's inability to outmaneuver Robert E. Lee caused the campaign to rely on attrition for a decision. Grant may have wanted to defeat Lee through a campaign of maneuver, but he adopted a conservative approach instead since he was secure in his overall
superiority of resources Unless he did something very stupid, the manpower and industrial might of the North almost guaranteed victory. Unfortunately, the cost in lives was much more than it might have been had he conducted a successful campaign of maneuver"
""I do not believe," Grant confessed, "that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that I had never studied the tactics that I used." Grant training at leading an Army, even down down to a Brigade, was zero, he had never been trained for any command role.
Mackubin T. Owens, USN War College
"Grant, on the other hand, has been described as a "butcher. According to the conventional wisdom, Grant lacked strategic sense and tactical competence and was able to achieve victory only by taking advantage of the manpower and material superiority of the Union to bludgeon his opponent into submission."
Lincoln
"To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his entrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it, that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it."
And yet that all that grant achieved , the very opposite of lincolsn desire.
Grant cautioned the government that the cost of Overland would be and additional 100,000 casualties, ( he was off as he suffered 127,000 in the next 12 months, excluding sick l;osses) which was why he wanted 200k+ to go South with, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=chi.19958599&view=1up&seq=391. More than had been incurred since the war had began would now come about in 6 weeks he thought, from an AoP that would be the biggest it ever had been allowed to be, nearly twice what Mac was allowed to do the same job, who got to the S Side of Richmond without a loss of life.
US Grant explaining his use of attrition.
"I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy...Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land. These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole county."
As for a military education
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll3/id/1523/rec/50
"Grant's inability to outmaneuver Robert E. Lee caused the campaign to rely on attrition for a decision. Grant may have wanted to defeat Lee through a campaign of maneuver, but he adopted a conservative approach instead since he was secure in his overall
superiority of resources Unless he did something very stupid, the manpower and industrial might of the North almost guaranteed victory. Unfortunately, the cost in lives was much more than it might have been had he conducted a successful campaign of maneuver"
""I do not believe," Grant confessed, "that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that I had never studied the tactics that I used." Grant training at leading an Army, even down down to a Brigade, was zero, he had never been trained for any command role.
5fish
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The facts show Lee's casualty rate was 20%, and Grant's was far lower... It shows Lee's casualty rate was no better than other commanders in the Civil War, but much higher than Grant's... A soldier in Lee's army had a one-in-five chance of being killed or wounded in the Civil War... @Hannibal, you should ask why Grant's casualty rate was far lower than other commanders' while he was always the aggressor in the battle; you would think his casualty rate would be the same or higher or maybe it comes down to his numerical advantage in numbers... ... Your @Hannibal other question should be: Was it just chance that Lee won all those battles while his casualty rate was nothing special, or was it just incompetent Union commanders... or maybe it comes down to numbers...
Asked and answered. Because you are innumerate the answer is beyond you, any further explanation of how to use math would serve no purpose.
It was not.
5fish
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I was using data collected by historians, so Don Quixote, go fight that windmill...
Why Grant Won and Lee Lost – The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
www.clevelandcivilwarroundtable.com
Lee fought aggressively, often attacking even though his side was supposedly on the defensive. His single army suffered about 55,000 more casualties than all of Grant’s armies combined
Finally, the respective casualty figures of these two generals contradict the myth about who, if either, was a butcher. For the entire war, Grant’s soldiers incurred about 154,000 casualties (killed, wounded, missing, captured) while imposing about 191,000 casualties on their foes. In all their battles, Lee’s troops incurred about 209,000 casualties while imposing about 240,000 casualties on their opponents. Thus, both generals armies imposed about 40,000 more casualties than they incurred. However, Lee, who should have been fighting defensively and preserving his precious manpower, instead exceeded Grant’s understandable aggressiveness and incurred 55,000 more casualties than Grant.
Your are the unable to understand the at data.
Asked and answered, more but different links all using the same authors numbers, who has replaced what the US Army terms a casualty with his own is not a good place to start from. Still les repeating a basic ignorance of how to mathematically measure efficiency.Why Grant Won and Lee Lost – The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
Lee fought aggressively, often attacking even though his side was supposedly on the defensive. His single army suffered about 55,000 more casualties than all of Grant’s armies combined
Finally, the respective casualty figures of these two generals contradict the myth about who, if either, was a butcher. For the entire war, Grant’s soldiers incurred about 154,000 casualties (killed, wounded, missing, captured) while imposing about 191,000 casualties on their foes. In all their battles, Lee’s troops incurred about 209,000 casualties while imposing about 240,000 casualties on their opponents. Thus, both generals armies imposed about 40,000 more casualties than they incurred. However, Lee, who should have been fighting defensively and preserving his precious manpower, instead exceeded Grant’s understandable aggressiveness and incurred 55,000 more casualties than Grant.
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5fish
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Well, Don Quixote, you should contact him and correct him; that is your windmill... He did this before a civil war roundtable... You would think someone might just call the guy out... I support the numbers I have found, backed by historians... the windmills are calling you...
Asked and answerd.
He died in 2017. he was corrected when it was first in print.
They did,
Here is aReview by Cleveland round table of Bonekemper, its pretty scathing https://www.clevelandcivilwarroundt...ost-the-civil-war-by-edward-h-bonekemper-iii/ btw all his works have reviwers noting he is a revisionst.
In summary, the author has produced a book based on misrepresentation, selective quotations, statistics, and misunderstanding to support an argument not fully thought through or presented. Whilst the casual reader may find it useful, the more serious or objective student of the Civil War or military historian will quite quickly observe that it is not based upon a realistic assessment of the situation or factors at the time. Whatever the rights or wrongs of his argument, the author has failed to present a credible argument in this book.
Although the title of the book being what it is, the student of military history will be aware before they open the cover that whatever the merits of the book are, objectivity is not going to be one of them. it might be well to just state that I write this review not as a rebuttal to the author’s claims, but as an assessment of its value as a fair conclusion to arrive at when reviewing all the facts.The main question to be addressed is to what extent the claim of the author is based on sound constructive evidence, objectively considered? The observant will note that I do not state the conclusion of the author, as it is quite apparent that the book’s conclusion came first and the body of the book written to support that conclusion. It is also quite apparent that Edward Bonekemper is a lawyer; he builds a case for the prosecution while ignoring or minimizing all contrary evidence, leaving that to the defense.The serious reader will quickly spot that a fair amount of misrepresentation in their description is involved, and the narrative includes a fair amount of what we would today call “spin.”The author’s opinions as to Lee resigning once “defeat became obvious” shows a clear lack of understanding of the main subject of the book: Robert Lee, himself, and of Western military convention. It has long been standard in Western armies that whilst a General may offer his resignation, if it is not accepted, he will continue. This is because, in a Western army, whilst a General has the right to resign, his men do not, and as a result Generals have traditionally considered resignation in wartime to be desertion. To suggest that Lee should have done what he would undoubtedly have considered tantamount to desertion and abandoning his post shows a worryingly lack of knowledge about General Lee.
They are not backed by anyone other than Bonekemper, and he uses his own numbers in preference to historians, but you have not read his book so you dont know what he passes of data.
As to Bonkempers cherry picked statistics. His argument and what he wants readers to believe is that the % of an armies losses is the prime indicator of a Generals abilitys. It counts only what is lost, not the cost in inflicting it, which is stand practice in measuring effeiecency. Cherry picking is to not count the total number of men under Frants command, that he can then use, but use some battles and others as campaigns, it follows that this method isa dilbberate math matical tactic to distort the data and supporta existing bias, because the outcome is comparerd only to other general single battles. Example in 64 he lumps many battles in as campaigns, so undercounts Grants number avaiable to use in many battles, resulting in grant haveing in Bonkempers book 1000s of 000s less troops to use than he did in reality and then compares that to others who dont get there data treated the same way. This method, of counting the totals present at each battle/campaign and adding them up, means instead of the PFD and replacemenmt strength Grant had in fact, and was the number he could use, is replaced by adding the strength at each battle up, this inflates the strength by massive orders of magnitude, and then compares actual calaties to this inflated numbers to geta lower end number, which is the whole reason he chose to do it that way, to confirm his pre existing bias by distorting the dat, Grant did not have and use nearlya million men in the East using his method.
Exasmple
CS achieves all its goals South mountain 1862, who however perfoms better?. Bonkemper would have you believe that the totals of CS losses are higher than US totals therfore the US was doing better.
Otoh is you look at what it cost to inflict as % of your own strength on the enemy the % it lost you get a totaly different perspective on effieceny and who was better.
US 28000 2,325 losses +10%-8%
CS 18000 2685 losses +13%-15%
Antietam
US 67,000 12,410 losses +15%-19%
CS 40000 10,316 losses +31%-26%
So for lee the campaign cost 13287. Inflicting 27371.
For Mc it cost 12641. Inflicting 13001.
Or Mc lost what it cost him to inflict, while Lee was inflicting 2 for every 1 he lost in doing so. Mac did not have 67000+28000=95000 as he had 87,164 PFD to fight both battles with, while lee did not have 58,000 but had 75,305 PFD both using the last PFD numbers in sept for each side.
Another example of Bonkemper wanting a reader to believe lee was worse than hooker, at Chancelrsville lee lost 21% to hookers 13%, so Hookers the better General according to Bonkemper as hooker army lost the lower number.
This goes into overdrive in 64 in the east as Bonkemper omits double counting grants numerical advatage.
Statistical issues by Bonkekemper
He has Grants losses at Belomont at 501, Grants casulaty return has 607, and for a skirmish at 2 days before as 85, total reported 692, an undercount of 191 by Bonekemper. Not a good start.
He continues, for Fort Donelson 2832, which is correct, ignores Fort Henry with its 47 ignores new Madrid with its 51 ( Grant was in overall command and Pope just follwed his order) a 98 undercount.
Shiloh he has 13047 while grants report has 13844, an undercount of 797.
Iuka he has 790
He misses out first Corinth with its 1000 casualties.
2nd Corinth/ Hatchie River he has 3,120 no isues.
He misses out Chicksaw bayou 1176 under count
he misses out Dover 110 undercount
he misses ouit Grand Gulf 80 undercount
he misses out port Gibson 861 undercount
he misses out Raymod 446 undercount
he misses out Jackson 286 under count
he misses out Champion hill 2447 undercount
he mises out Big Black river 276 undercount
Vicksburg Campaign he has a total 9,362 which is a an over count of 2000.
Chattanooga 5,814 no issues.
Return to Jackson he has 1122 no issues.
He goes East
Wilderness 17,666 18000
misses out Walthall junction 275 undercount
Misses out Swift creek and Fort clifton495 undercount
misses out chester station 285 undercount
misses out Cloyds Mouintain 688
misses out Cove mountain 150
Misses out yellow tavern 400
Spotsylvania Court House 18,399 no issues
misses out Ware bottom/hawlets farm 750
North Anna River, etc. 3,986 no issues
misses out Wilson warf 26
misses out haws shop 344
misses out tototemploy and Bethseda 821
misses out Matadequin creek 90
Cold Harbor 12,737no issues
misses out piedmont 875
Petersburg Assaults 11,386 no issues
misses out Trevalian station 1007
misses out Jeruslam plank road 2962
misses out sammaria bridge 350
Misses ouit reams station 375
misses out Petersburg II assault 10600
Misses out petersburg 60
mises out rutherford farm 242
Petersburg Siege/Campaign 42,000 no issues
Appomattox Campaig 10,780 no issues.
A combined undercount of 27000 for Grants losses, which is a 18% undercounts of grants casualties, if you add in the strength on hand for the engagements not used grants total use of US troops rises to over a million, resulting it a c50% undercount of grants manpower, so his entire diatribe is baseless math as he cherry picked the data to get the result he wanted, as he was not interested in understanding history, but promoting his bias.
To be clear why adding up the numbers used in each engagement is skewing the data, the way bonkemper did, odd how 5fish does not like standard math tools and calls them skewed but supports doing it the way Bonekemper did dont yall think,
In 64 Grant was Theatre commander and had everything under his authority:
Grant's main army (all figures 30 Apr 64 trimonthly reports
Army of the Potomac: 102,869 PFD
9th Corps: 19,250 PFD
Stripped from the Washington Defences and new Drafts: 30,264 PFD
Department of Virginia and NC: 53,049
deduct District of NC: - 6,334
Total force = 199,088 PFD to which another 15% of that arrived as replacements during the conflict.
Grant never had the numbers Bonekemper gives him, with his chery picked numbers, by adding up all the the numbers of all of Grants engagements as Bonemper does not do, Grant now has over 5 times that number, the historical grant had to use, ie Grant uses the same mam more than once Boonekempter thinks they are added together to have more than one man to use which is then compared to his reported losses to find a low loss rate as dividing a small number by a a big number can only ever do that which was no doubt why he he did not use the Lincoln Presidential exhibits week by week losses for every week of the war data or the US army land warfare database for the top 384 engagements, but chose to use instead to cherry pick.
In 64 Grant was Theatre commander and had everything under his authority:
Grant's main army (all figures 30 Apr 64 trimonthly reports
Army of the Potomac: 102,869 PFD
9th Corps: 19,250 PFD
Stripped from the Washington Defences and new Drafts: 30,264 PFD
Department of Virginia and NC: 53,049
deduct District of NC: - 6,334
Total force = 199,088 PFD to which another 15% of that arrived as replacements during the conflict.
Grant never had the numbers Bonekemper gives him, with his chery picked numbers, by adding up all the the numbers of all of Grants engagements as Bonemper does not do, Grant now has over 5 times that number, the historical grant had to use, ie Grant uses the same mam more than once Boonekempter thinks they are added together to have more than one man to use which is then compared to his reported losses to find a low loss rate as dividing a small number by a a big number can only ever do that which was no doubt why he he did not use the Lincoln Presidential exhibits week by week losses for every week of the war data or the US army land warfare database for the top 384 engagements, but chose to use instead to cherry pick.
Bonekemper says. “The South was in ruins, and twenty-five percent of men aged 20-45 were dead.”
US census has that at 1.5million, of which c94000 were KIA, 164k dies of disease, 31k died as pows, which is 19% mortality in the at age group was high without any war, so the deaths from disease were going to happen in any event, the war just increased that rate, whcig means the effect of the war was not a 164 rate, but around half (uisng death from disease in US males who did not serve) that bring ing the total down to c14%, Grants lost death to disease in the East was c40k but Bonkemper is not interested in a general ability to keep his soldiers healthy, Hood having a better rate at keeping his army healthy than Johnston was one reason why he could maintain his strength for combat despite higher combat losses.
Bonekmper dis not know what to count of how to count it, he thought slavery a benevolent institution, showed the math of why it was, for crying out load.
US census has that at 1.5million, of which c94000 were KIA, 164k dies of disease, 31k died as pows, which is 19% mortality in the at age group was high without any war, so the deaths from disease were going to happen in any event, the war just increased that rate, whcig means the effect of the war was not a 164 rate, but around half (uisng death from disease in US males who did not serve) that bring ing the total down to c14%, Grants lost death to disease in the East was c40k but Bonkemper is not interested in a general ability to keep his soldiers healthy, Hood having a better rate at keeping his army healthy than Johnston was one reason why he could maintain his strength for combat despite higher combat losses.
Bonekmper dis not know what to count of how to count it, he thought slavery a benevolent institution, showed the math of why it was, for crying out load.
5fish
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Here is a stat for you...
Yes, generals in the American Civil War frequently entered the fighting on or near the front lines, and it was considered their duty to actively lead and rally their men under fire. Consequently, the casualty rate for these officers was staggeringly high, with nearly 19% of Confederate generals and 8% of Union generals killed in action or dying of their wounds. [1, 2, 3]
Yes, generals in the American Civil War frequently entered the fighting on or near the front lines, and it was considered their duty to actively lead and rally their men under fire. Consequently, the casualty rate for these officers was staggeringly high, with nearly 19% of Confederate generals and 8% of Union generals killed in action or dying of their wounds. [1, 2, 3]