Lee Makes an Excuse...

[5fish]

In Lee's report on Gettysburg, he refers to his wagons as for a reason why he choose to stay and engage the union army. He states it would have been to difficult to retire and move due to the wagons. I have read this in other writing on Gettysburg about these wagons.

Well I disagree, he had no problem retreating from Gettysburg with those same wagons. He executed one of the great retreats in history with those wagons over the same roads he would have used if he had choose to retire or move from Gettysburg, instead of engaging the union army.

I think we have caught Lee making an excuse(yes, an excuse) for why he was forced to engage the union army at Gettysburg due to the wagons.

He argues its the wagons that force him to stay and fight at Gettysburg but in the end he had no problem retreating from Gettysburg with those same wagons.

I think these wagons are a half harted try by Lee to excuse why he choose to engage the union army on ground he did not chose.

Lee makes an excuse!

 

[Kirk's Raider's]

In Lee's report on Gettysburg, he refers to his wagons as for a reason why he choose to stay and engage the union army. He states it would have been to difficult to retire and move due to the wagons. I have read this in other writing on Gettysburg about these wagons.

Well I disagree, he had no problem retreating from Gettysburg with those same wagons. He executed one of the great retreats in history with those wagons over the same roads he would have used if he had choose to retire or move from Gettysburg, instead of engaging the union army.

I think we have caught Lee making an excuse(yes, an excuse) for why he was forced to engage the union army at Gettysburg due to the wagons.

He argues its the wagons that force him to stay and fight at Gettysburg but in the end he had no problem retreating from Gettysburg with those same wagons.

I think these wagons are a half harted try by Lee to excuse why he choose to engage the union army on ground he did not chose.

Lee makes an excuse!

I think you are being to hard on old Marse Robert. As I and many others have stated numerous times Lee had no choice but to mount an offensive against the Union. Lee could only get so many troops especially since Davis denied Lee Confederate troops encircling New Berne,North Carolina plus the Confederate Army had many troops tied down in the West.
Donald Rumsfeld said " one goes to war with the army one has" . Lee did the best he could with the resources that were available. War is not about perfection. All a general can do is the best he can with the resources available. A general with the smaller army is going to have to take greater risks then the general with the larger army. Sometimes risks work for the better sometimes not so much. Gettysburg is an example of not so much.
Kirk's Raider's

 

[5fish]

Those wagons returned with wounded and you have to add the wagons Stuart had captured as well. It seems Lee's excuse is poor... After the battle the roads were the same plus muddy by rains, along with thousands of wounded being carried, and with new captured wagons in tow. I think Lee excuse was poor...

 

[Kirk's Raider's]

Those wagons returned with wounded and you have to add the wagons Stuart had captured as well. It seems Lee's excuse is poor... After the battle the roads were the same plus muddy by rains, along with thousands of wounded being carried, and with new captured wagons in tow. I think Lee excuse was poor...

An offensive army deep in enemy territory and cut off from logistical support facing an enemy that just defeated them is going to have to retreat.
In a nutshell Gettysburg was a hail Mary pass that didn't work out. On the other hand Lee had no choice but to make a hail Mary pass.
Kirk's Raider's

 

[Hannibal]

In Lee's report on Gettysburg, he refers to his wagons as for a reason why he choose to stay and engage the union army. He states it would have been to difficult to retire and move due to the wagons. I have read this in other writing on Gettysburg about these wagons.

Except in his report/s, https://www.nps.gov/gett/learn/historyculture/official-report-of-general-robert-e-lee.htm https://explorepahistory.com/odocument.php?docId=1-4-F4.html nothing you claim exists in them.

I think we have caught Lee making an excuse(yes, an excuse) for why he was forced to engage the union army at Gettysburg due to the wagons.

Wagons were not there on day one, Picket was guarding them miles away. What we caught is you making up stuff.

He argues its the wagons that force him to stay and fight at Gettysburg but in the end he had no problem retreating from Gettysburg with those same wagons.

I think these wagons are a half harted try by Lee to excuse why he choose to engage the union army on ground he did not chose.

Lee makes an excuse!

Nope that just you making up stuff that is not in lee report/s. As for Meade, he had to use wagons to try and catch lee, his base of supply
1500 tons a day arriving via RR at Westminster..
2.5 mph rate of Wagon movement.
4000 wagons at 2800lbs each.
1100 ambulances bring casualties to the rail head, reduced the usable road net.
Westminster 25 miles to G-Burg.

2.5mph for 10 hours=25 miles, one day per trip from source to consumption point.
25 miles is 44000 yards, 132000 feet, at 30 feet a wagon/team is room for 4400 wagons each way, road net is 8800 with throughputs per day of 5100 wagons.


Westminster to Supply AoP at G-Burg
1500, 3,360,000 lbs tons in by rail.
Out by 2000 wagon, 4,560,000. 2000 empty arrive from army for next day. 2035 tons forward lift achieved.

Lee makes a stand on the 11th at Hagerstown, c35/40 miles by road via Waynsbor/Fairfield.

Base of supply Westminster, AoP Hagerstown, 40 miles away, Waynsboro is mid way.
G-Burg to Waynsboro 1000*2280=2,280,000, 1000 empty arrive from Waynsboro.
Waynsboro to Hagerstown 1000*2280=2,280,000, 1000 empty arrive from Hagerston.

Supplies reaching AoP each day, 1017 tons a day, at 3 lbs a man 76,000 can be supplied. AoP July 10th on hand strength 80,000., or in short after chasing for 40 miles, a two day pursuit, he cant supply himself by use of wagons any more, the entire road of miles is full of wagons, 8000 wagons each at 30 feet is 45 miles of wagons, there is no room to use the roads for anything else as wagons are on it head to tail.But he only has 4000 wagons ( and the horses need to be fed from what they wagons are carrying) in any event to do a job that needs twice that at 40 miles from base of supply.

 

[LJMYERS]

Yes some went down RT-11 past the Boyd house near Inwood. General Pettegrew died at the Boyd house which was owned by Belle Boyd's uncle. There was a monument their with a large cannon ball on top up until a few years ago. Someone took it. There is talk of a data center there now. Although Lennar wants to put town houses there.

 

[LJMYERS]

Chief Gettysburg Nurse Salome Myers Stuart wrote about the wounded at Gettysburg both North and South. She was a trained nurse from Mount Saint Mary's College in Emmitsburg MD.

 

[LJMYERS]

Some historians say Salome Myers Stuart was related to both Hunter John Myers and his friend John Esten Cooke who's cousin Floria Cooke married CSA General JEB Stuart. The Cooke's although Protestant, were very frendly with the teachers at Mount Saint Mary's College in Emmitsburg MD.

 

[Hannibal]

Chief Gettysburg Nurse Salome Myers Stuart wrote about the wounded at Gettysburg both North and South. She was a trained nurse from Mount Saint Mary's College in Emmitsburg MD.

US before 62 did not have a prof or proper Ambulance Corps, staffed by civilians it failed in its purpose, Bull Run US wounded had to walk back to the Capital for treatment, once it did under Letterman in 62, along with proper ambulances that were sprung, the treatment of its wounded increased, all US wounded at Antietam were removed from the battlefield and taken to a hospital inside 24 hours, a process of triage was used, first they went to a field dressing station close to the front lines, bleeding was stopped etc, chloroform was used here, if able to return he did, if he needed, in a Docs opinion, further treatment, surgery etc, under ether, he was taken 1/2 miles to the rear where tented or any large structure, churchs were often used, field hospital performed surgery's, ( amputation here had a 27% death rate before 62 ) anything needing long term recovery they were then sent of to a mil hospital in the the rear to recover, amputation here after 24 hours had a 57% death rate. WBTS did not have a golden hour ( 1980s or so)for wound treatment, but they did know the first 24 hours was important.

 

[Hannibal]

Some historians say Salome Myers Stuart was related to both Hunter John Myers and his friend John Esten Cooke who's cousin Floria Cooke married CSA General JEB Stuart. The Cooke's although Protestant, were very frendly with the teachers at Mount Saint Mary's College in Emmitsburg MD.

#

This is prob best resolved by looking at family trees https://ancestors.familysearch.org/en/LHVG-XFV/elizabeth-salome-myers-1842-1922

 

[LJMYERS]

#

This is prob best resolved by looking at family trees https://ancestors.familysearch.org/en/LHVG-XFV/elizabeth-salome-myers-1842-1922

It also helps to read her book. On a side note, Salome is a Jewish name and she says she is related to the Jewish Troxals of Frederick County MD. West Virginia records show Hunter John Myers from Shanghai West Virginia was also Jewish but converted to the Catholic Church. Then names Cooke Stuart Myers Murphy Donner Smith Young are all Nauvoo Ill names more or least around St Mary's Catholic Girls School at Nauvoo Ill. My dad said we are all related to Catholic actress Loretta Young from St Lake City Utah. Young is a very common name in Salt Lake City Utah. What is not so common is the Catholic Youngs of Salt Lake City Utah and Nauvoo Ill. Joseph Smith's wife was Catholic. The Smith name goes all they way back to Pocahontas and her father.

 

[Hannibal]

It also helps to read her book.

Ok, so in her book ( "The Care of the Wounded", Sallie Myers Stewart, which is primarily an account of th 12 she helped ) does it show a family tree?, can you post that image?, your post indicated there is confusion over family relations, where none should exist, if not, then see post 10.

 

[LJMYERS]

Ok, so in her book ( "The Care of the Wounded", Sallie Myers Stewart, which is primarily an account of th 12 she helped ) does it show a family tree?, can you post that image?, your post indicated there is confusion over family relations, where none should exist, if not, then see post 10.

About the Troxals of Frederick MD. sure. About the Stuarts/Stewards of Pittsburgh sure. About her fight with General JEB Stuart over Shoes sure. About the Culps of Culps Hill sure. About Col Lawrence Chamberlan and his brother, sure. Since you have the book, why do you need postings? How about the Link book about the Eisenhowers of Pittsburgh related to Train Photographer O Winston Link. The book title is Ties to the Past. There might be another book Care of the Wounded. That might be a very rare copy that I do not have.

 

[Hannibal]

Since you have the book, why do you need postings? The book title is Ties to the Past. There might be another book Care of the Wounded. That might be a very rare copy that I do not have.

Because what you post is not in her book regarding care of the wounded, Ties of the past, is not by here, its about here, its by her by great great granddaughter Sarah Sites Rodger who published that in 1996.

 

[5fish]

Except in his report/s, https://www.nps.gov/gett/learn/historyculture/official-report-of-general-robert-e-lee.htm https://explorepahistory.com/odocument.php?docId=1-4-F4.html nothing you claim exists in them.

I sniped this out: them wagons... It seems in hindsight Lee miscalculated the moment... I want to point out that Longstreet wanted to move around the Union Army instead of staying and continuing to fight. I ask if Longstreet believed the army could move, the wagons could move, and Lee retreated; with those same wagon...

snip...

The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a larger force, with which two of his divisions became engaged . Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops . Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every efforts was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our with our large trains.

At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable . Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement off the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.

 

[LJMYERS]

The Auburn Wagon Works owned by the Sewards, was located in Martinsburg WV. You must follow the Historic Property Records to see the flow or raw materials such as wood and nails. Davy Crockett and his friend Henry Myers worked for the Auburn Wagon Works in Martinsburg when they were teenagers.

 

[Hannibal]

I sniped this out: them wagons... It seems in hindsight Lee miscalculated the moment... I want to point out that Longstreet wanted to move around the Union Army instead of staying and continuing to fight. I ask if Longstreet believed the army could move, the wagons could move, and Lee retreated; with those same wagon...

snip...

The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a larger force, with which two of his divisions became engaged . Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops . Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every efforts was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our with our large trains.

At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable . Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement off the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.

As already pointed out what you claim is not present in lees reports, you made it up because you cant read, and dont know what lee is reffering to.

28th Pickets at Chambersburg, 30 miles from G/Burg guarding the wagon train, waiting for Imboden to came and relieve him of that Duty. Same day lee orders the concentration at Gettysburg and Picket to join there when Imboden relives him of wagon guard duty. Picket stays till 2nd June as do the wagons then he goes to G/burg.

Lees wagon train is nowhere near the battle of G/Burg.

After the battles was over, he had 000s of wounded to move to saftey, a 17 mile ambulance train was created on the 4th to carry them away to cashtown gap, 10 miles ina different the Mtns he refers to, Lee had no casualties till he fought and had them inflicted, so they could not influence his decision to fight which he made days before the

The battle was in a measure, unavoidable, is not related to the future needs of the wounded, because he did not know how many there may be, as it was he left nearly 7k to becaome pows because he lacked the means to move them, but because he could not forage in the prescience of the AoP

 

[5fish]

The battle was in a measure, unavoidable, is not related to the future needs of the wounded, because he did not know how many there may be, as it was he left nearly 7k to becaome pows because he lacked the means to move them, but because he could not forage in the prescience of the AoP

AI thoughts on the matter....

Realistically, General Robert E. Lee could not have easily or safely disengaged and retreated after the first day of Gettysburg (July 1, 1863). A withdrawal would have been a difficult military maneuver in the face of an incoming enemy. However, several factors made staying and fighting equally dangerous. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Here is a breakdown of why disengagement was incredibly risky, along with the strategic arguments for doing so:

Why Disengagement Was Difficult

• Vulnerable Logistics: Lee's supply lines were already stretched dangerously thin into Pennsylvania. He was operating far beyond his base without a secure net. [1, 2]
• No Cover for Retreat: Lee lacked his cavalry for much of the first day. Without J.E.B. Stuart's horsemen to screen the movement and guard the flanks, a retreat would have been highly hazardous. [1, 2, 3]
• Lack of Surprise: Moving an entire army of nearly 65,000 men without Union commander George Meade noticing was almost impossible. Meade’s forces would have easily detected and pursued the Confederates during a daylight withdrawal. [1, 2, 3]

The Arguments to Disengage

• Longstreet’s Advice: Confederate First Corps Commander James Longstreet famously advocated against fighting on ground not of their choosing. He advised Lee to disengage and maneuver to place the Confederate army between Meade's forces and Washington, D.C.. [1]
• Tactical Risk of an Assault: Longstreet and other officers protested attacking the Union lines on July 2nd, knowing that assaulting a dug-in Union position across open ground was dangerous and unlikely to succeed. [1, 2, 3]

The Ultimate Reality
As historians often discuss, Lee's offensive strategy was to destroy or severely damage the Union Army of the Potomac in Northern territory. Leaving the area without a decisive engagement would have ultimately required him to retreat back into Virginia anyway. This would have meant abandoning the invasion without achieving his objectives.

General Robert E. Lee could not disengage on the first day of Gettysburg (July 1, 1863) because the Confederate army had already committed to a massive meeting engagement. However, he was able to retreat entirely after the third day (July 4, 1863) due to changing tactical paradigms, geography, and Union caution. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Why Lee Could Not Disengage on Day 1:

• Momentum of the Fight: What began as a chance encounter quickly escalated into a major battle. Lee believed he could defeat the fragmented Union forces before their army fully consolidated. [1, 2, 3]
• Tactical Risk: Disengaging an army while in direct contact with the enemy during the day is highly dangerous. Turning his back on the Union Army of the Potomac would have left his forces highly vulnerable to devastating counterattacks. [1, 2]
• Overconfidence: Lee’s prior successes (such as at Chancellorsville) fueled his belief that his infantry was invincible, incentivizing him to press the attack rather than withdraw to better ground. [1]

Why Lee Was Able to Retreat After Day 3:

• Passive Stance of the Union: On the evening of July 3 and throughout July 4, Union commander Maj. Gen. George Meade did not launch a massive counterattack. This allowed the Confederates to hold their defensive positions on Seminary Ridge while organizing a massive, multi-day withdrawal. [1, 2]
• The Rules of Warfare: 19th-century military doctrine dictated that the army controlling the battlefield after an engagement was the victor and should remain in place. Meade needed to secure the territory repulsed by Pickett's Charge rather than aggressively pursue. [1, 2, 3]
• Geographic Shielding: The mountainous terrain worked in Lee's favor. The Gettysburg area sits a short distance east of the South Mountain range. Once the Confederates retreated through the mountain passes into the Cumberland Valley, they had natural defensive barriers shielding their movements. [1]
• Union Caution in Pursuit: Although Lincoln urged a more vigorous pursuit, Meade's army was exhausted, heavily bloodied (having suffered nearly \(23,000\) casualties), and hesitant to trap a desperate, entrenched enemy

 

[LJMYERS]

Just think if the Eisenhowers of Gettysburg had something to do with this.