'Find Mr. Calhoun's thesis if you please:

Combine that with the observations of David G. Surdam about the effect of the Civil War blockade and consider the long term affect. For three years very little cotton was exported from the Confederacy. Surdam's best estimate is that about 1/9th of the normal amount of cotton made it out of the blockade or was brought into US trading towns.
Mr. Calhoun's data at page 62 approximately and at 406 show that by the time the US Civil War ended, there was not a severe cotton shortage. International competition was supplying much of the cotton required in England and France. The price subsided consistently and those operations that got back into production did not reap a windfall in extremely high prices.
The cost advantage in the US gradually put the other producers out of business. But part of that cost advantage was new production in
Texas, as Calhoun explained. The Pennsylvania railroad man Tom Scott and the TCRR engineer Grenville Dodge went to Texas to build railroads. In the rest of the south the railroad building slowly crept forward. And that added even more competition for the older cotton growing regions.
During a 18 year period from 1862 to 1879, in what should have been the height of the cotton boom, the Confederate growers, and the US growers did not get the revenue their competitive advantage should have earned for them. With the US economy recovering and sewing machines reducing the cost of finished clothing and bedding, US demand alone would have paid good money for a share of US cotton production.
But by the time the dust had settled around 1890, cotton production had skyrocketed, but the price had fallen in both nominal and real terms.
Outside of Texas, there was no rush to invest in reopening the cotton acreage. Calhoun reported that many who tried it found the price the broker would pay for the cotton at harvest time didn't cover the costs. The pre planting arithmetic looked good, but the final accounting did not add up well.
There were few cities. Not an abundance of cash. And it was relatively easy for the Midwest railroads to buy their way south, gradually.
There are more reasons the southern areas of the US lagged behind after the US Civil War. But the decrease in cotton revenue made it hard to attract labor and capital. The money flowed to Missouri, Texas and the west in general.

Combine that with the observations of David G. Surdam about the effect of the Civil War blockade and consider the long term affect. For three years very little cotton was exported from the Confederacy. Surdam's best estimate is that about 1/9th of the normal amount of cotton made it out of the blockade or was brought into US trading towns.
Mr. Calhoun's data at page 62 approximately and at 406 show that by the time the US Civil War ended, there was not a severe cotton shortage. International competition was supplying much of the cotton required in England and France. The price subsided consistently and those operations that got back into production did not reap a windfall in extremely high prices.
The cost advantage in the US gradually put the other producers out of business. But part of that cost advantage was new production in
Texas, as Calhoun explained. The Pennsylvania railroad man Tom Scott and the TCRR engineer Grenville Dodge went to Texas to build railroads. In the rest of the south the railroad building slowly crept forward. And that added even more competition for the older cotton growing regions.
During a 18 year period from 1862 to 1879, in what should have been the height of the cotton boom, the Confederate growers, and the US growers did not get the revenue their competitive advantage should have earned for them. With the US economy recovering and sewing machines reducing the cost of finished clothing and bedding, US demand alone would have paid good money for a share of US cotton production.
But by the time the dust had settled around 1890, cotton production had skyrocketed, but the price had fallen in both nominal and real terms.
Outside of Texas, there was no rush to invest in reopening the cotton acreage. Calhoun reported that many who tried it found the price the broker would pay for the cotton at harvest time didn't cover the costs. The pre planting arithmetic looked good, but the final accounting did not add up well.
There were few cities. Not an abundance of cash. And it was relatively easy for the Midwest railroads to buy their way south, gradually.
There are more reasons the southern areas of the US lagged behind after the US Civil War. But the decrease in cotton revenue made it hard to attract labor and capital. The money flowed to Missouri, Texas and the west in general.