Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 469-470
Fort Sumter And Confederate Diplomacy By Ludwell H. Johnson.pdf
All sorts of activity and rumors flying about. It is apparent that Lincoln is not going to evacuate Sumter and Pickens.
The telegrams that arrived daily from Washington certainly did nothing to create confidence. "Much activity to-day in the War and Navy Departments," the commissioners wired on April 3. "It is said the Minnesota, at Boston, has been ordered to the mouth of the Mississippi. Powhatan suddenly put in commission to sail next week. Four companies now here . . . ordered to New York. Report says these movements have reference to the San Domingo question."81 On the 4th they repeated that this expedition was headed for San Domingo. But, they warned, "all this fleet may now or hereafter be ordered to our coast; hence we would say strengthen the defenses at the mouths of the Mississippi."82 The 5th saw these preparations still in progress. A "formidable military and naval force" was involved, Toombs was informed. Statements that San Domingo was the destination might be true or might be a ruse, said the commissioners, plumbing the depths of uncertainty. "Having no confidence in the administration, we say, be ever on your guard . . . . The notice promised us will come at the last moment if the fleet be intended for our waters."83 On April 6 Walker ordered Beauregard to isolate Sumter completely. "The courtesies which have been accorded to the commander of that fortress have been . . . taken advantage of in some cases by persons whose object in visiting Fort Sumter was chiefly to obtain information of the state of our defenses, to be communicated to the Government at Washington."84 By this time it had definitely been concluded at Montgomery that an expedition to reinforce Pickens was then weighing anchor, and additional troops were called to Pensacola to meet it.85 In Charleston, the newspapers were full of the warlike preparations then going on in the North. The venerable dean of secessionists, Edmund Ruffin, wrote in his diary on the 6th that "everything seems to indicate some new and serious attempt to strike an unlooked-for blow on the C.S., either reinforcing the blockaded forts, or (as also rumored) to blockade the Mississippi River."86 At ten-thirty that night the commissioners wired Toombs that there had been.
No change in the activity of the warlike armaments mentioned yesterday. The rumors that they are destined against Pickens and perhaps Sumter are getting every day stronger. We know nothing positive on the subject, but advise equal activity on your part to receive them if they come. We have not yet been notified of the movement, but the notifications may come when they are ready to start.87
The Commissioners thought Justice Campbell got in touch with Steward and got a vague answer. Campbell accepted that Lincoln would notify Pickens before an relief attempt was made. Pickens was unknown.
In the face of a steady stream of alarming information, the commissioners decided to get in touch with Seward once again. On Sunday morning, April 7, they called on Campbell. At their request, the latter wrote Seward, described their anxiety, and recapitulated the assurances he had previously given them and which he had just repeated to the effect that prior notice would be given before any action was taken with respect to Sumter or Pickens. "But if I have said more than I am authorized," Camp- bell concluded, "I pray that you will advise me." As an answer he received an undated, unsigned note saying: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see; other suggestions received, and will be respectfully considered."88 Campbell digested this bit of ambiguity and then wrote the commissioners that he still believed Governor Pickens would be notified before an attempt was made to provision Sumter, but he no longer felt at liberty to say prior notice would be given of any change made at Fort Pickens. He then wrote Seward and informed him of what he had just told the Confederates.89
Without recognization and surrender of the forts, the Commissioners concluded 'If that answer was not satisfactory, they would "consider the gauntlet of war thrown down and close our mission."90"
At last Crawford and his colleagues were convinced that "a hostile movement is on foot and part of it sailed against the Confederate States." They so telegraphed Toombs, adding that they intended to notify Seward that their secretary would call at 2 P.M. the next day for an answer to their note of March 12. If that answer was not satisfactory, they would "consider the gauntlet of war thrown down and close our mission."90 The next morning, April 8, they wired the Charleston authorities that they had been told Sumter would not be supplied without notice, adding, however, that they placed no faith in these assurances; "the war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this hour."9' At 2:15 P.M. their secretary, John T. Pickett, called at the State Department. He was handed a blank envelope containing an unsigned memorandum which Seward had placed on file on March 15 when the commissioners agreed to defer their request for an answer. In it Seward refused to consider the Confederacy as an independent nation and declined to have any dealings with its alleged agents.92
This ends the diplomacy and my presentation. The Commissioners went to Washington with a demand for recognition or war and when that was not forthcoming, Davis initiated war. My reading of the record is that the CSA was overconfident boarding on arrogance in negotiation without much diplomatic skills. When the political situation changed from their ideal, they were unable to compensate.
Footnotes
88Oflicial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 258-59; copy of unsigned memorandum, dated Sunday morning, April 7, 1861, in Pickett Papers; Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, 340; Bancroft, Seward, II, 140-41n. By "other suggestions" Seward probably was referring to an offer by Campbell to go in person to Montgomery.
89Bancroft, Seward, II, 141n; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, IV, 36-37; Campbell to Crawford (copy), 2 P. M., April 7, 1861, in Picketit Papers.
900fficial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 258; original in the Pickett Papers. On the 7th Ruffin noted in his diary that telegraphic reports had been received in Charleston saying that "war steamers have been dispatched from Boston and New York, with 1800 soldiers to the South, but destination unknown." Ruffin, "The First Shot at Sumter," 71. 91Official Records, Series I, Vol. I, 289; Official Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 259.
920fficial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 259; memorandum by John T. Pickett in the Pickett Papers.
930fficial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. I, 259. The full text notice read: "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions and that if such attempt be not resisted no effort to throw in men, ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack the fort." Official Records, Series I, Vol. I, 291.
940ficial Records, Series I, Vol. I, 289.