Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy

jgoodguy

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wbull1 said:
The timing is interesting. The commissioners started meeting in Washington, DC on February 3 and Lincoln did not arrive in the Capital until twenty days later.
Crawford was the first commissioner to reach Washington, arriving there late on the morning of March 3. Soon after Lincoln's inauguration Seward was informed that a Confederate agent, Crawford, was in Washington and would ask immediately for an official interview and, if he were rebuffed, the impact on Southern opinion would probably force Davis to attack Forts Sumter and Pickens. Forsythe shows up March 12.
 

jgoodguy

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 466
Fort Sumter And Confederate Diplomacy By Ludwell H. Johnson.pdf

IMHO the commissioners were more trapped by their preconceptions than Steward's ability. The folks in Montgomery are planning for contingencies. Fox is found in the henhouse as his plan was revealed. No more nice guy in Charleston.

The mood of Confederate authorities at Montgomery was one of grim preparation for the worst; the portents of things to come were too plain to be ignored by those out of range of Seward's mesmeric dissembling. On March 26 the New York Tribune revealed that the purpose of Fox's trip to Sumter had been to perfect his plan for relieving the fort."7 In obvious reaction to this news, Beauregard was ordered to allow no one else to go to Sumter unless he himself saw the written instructions of the visitor and was satisfied that no deception was intended.8 And just in case the General had any tendencies toward complacency or false hopes, Walker sent him the following letter on April 2:
The Government has at no time placed any reliance on assurances by the Government at Washington in respect to the evacuation of Fort Sumter, or entertained any confidence in the disposition of the latter to make any concession or yield any point to which it is not driven by absolute necessity, and I desire that you will govern yourself generally with strict reference to this as the key to the policy of the Government of the Confederate States ....
[You should conduct yourself] precisely as if you were in the presence of an enemy contemplating to surprise you. The delays and apparent vacillations of the Washington Government make it imperative that the further concession of courtesies such as have been accorded to Major Anderson and his command, in supplies from the city, must cease; ... all communications . . . for any purpose of supply is absolutely inhibited ....79

And Walker concluded by saying that the mission of the Confederate agents in Washington might come to an end at any moment.
Footnotes
77Frank Moore (ed.), The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, etc. (12 vols., New York, 1862-1871), I, 3d section, 26.
78Oficial Records, Series I, Vol. I, 283.
79Ibid., 285.
 

jgoodguy

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 467-468
Fort Sumter And Confederate Diplomacy By Ludwell H. Johnson.pdf

Then the CSA government send a message with a different tone to the Commissioners implying they had the upper hand in the negotiations, and in a position to make demands for peace or even a delay.

On the same day Toombs sent off a dispatch to the commissioners which, in one important respect, was at sharp variance with Walker's letter to Beauregard. President Davis agreed, they were told, that Seward's policy would prevail and that its adoption by the United States would not be harmful to the interests of the Confederacy. In their March 26 letter to Toombs, the commissioners, exasperated by Seward's refusal to meet with Roman, had asked whether they should continue to "dally" with such a vacillating administration or put an end to delay and demand to be received at once. It was Davis' belief, wrote Toombs, that the delay caused by the "hesitating & doubting" policy of the United States was not injurious to the Confederacy. [style color=#000080]While the United States chose neither peace nor war, the Confederacy had the advantage of both conditions and was able to strengthen its defenses and consolidate its government.[/style] [style color=#000080]If the Lincoln administration were to propose a truce based on the status quo, to last until Congress met, a move the commissioners seemed to anticipate, they were to refuse unless the United States agreed to give up Sumter and Pickens.80[/style]

Davis misled his Commissioners. One moment the thought that the North was a pushover seems to be the dominant position then the next minute it was not a pushover to Beauregard, but nothing changed to the Commissioners. Now Davis has the prejudice that the US might not only not be a pushover, but it may attack. Did this change of attitude from pushover to prejudice help push Davis to shot first. It could be a preconceiveg tactic as the author suggests or maybe not.

At no other time throughout the entire crisis did the President express confidence that Seward's policy, which entailed the voluntary surrender of Sumter, would win out. This fact, together with the sentiments of extreme pessimism and distrust expressed in Walker's April 2 letter and elsewhere, lead to the conclusion that Davis was not being entirely candid with the commissioners. Instead, it would seem that he misrepresented his beliefs for the purpose of encouraging the commissioners to persist in their present course of action, thereby gaining time if nothing else. Consequently the letters of Walker and Davis are not contradictory. Taken together, they represent the two sides of Davis' strategy of defense: Refrain from bringing matters to a head, leave the door open to a peaceful settlement, and whatever the fate of the negotiations, use the time they afford to prepare for a possible attack. As for what Davis really expected to happen, there seems little reason to doubt he believed Lincoln was bent on armed coercion.
Footnotes

80Toombs to Crawford, Roman, and Forsyth, April 2, 1861, in Pickett Papers. There is a puzzling incident in this exchange of correspondence. A letter from Roman to Toombs of March 29 (the receipt of which was acknowledged in Toombs' April 2 letter) contained an enclosure which consisted of two parts, "The Answer" and "The Rejoinder." The first is the text of a letter in which the President of the United States is represented as replying to the commissioners' note of March 12 to the effect that he cannot open negotiations with them unless it is understood that such negotiations do not constitute recognition. If that is agreed, he is willing to talk to them. "The Rejoinder" is a projected reply by the commissioners, who, while stating that the Confederacy is an independent nation de facto and de jure, say that they have never made recognition of that independence a prerequisite of negotiations. They explicitly agree that such talks will not be considered to constitute recognition. In the April 2 letter, Davis describes the policy represented by the above enclosure as very "delicate." He returned a modified version of "The Rejoinder" to the commissioners, the only change being that instead of explicitly accepting Lincoln's proviso that negotiations would not connote recognition, the commissioners were to say that they had no objection to holding talks "upon the terms stated in the note of the President of the United States." The writer is not sure of the significance of this incident. Possibly the commissioners had some reason, since lost, for expecting such a letter from Lincoln; or perhaps there was a plan to publish a spurious correspondence for the purpose of arousing the peace element in the North and forcing Lincoln to talk to them.
 

jgoodguy

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 469-470
Fort Sumter And Confederate Diplomacy By Ludwell H. Johnson.pdf

All sorts of activity and rumors flying about. It is apparent that Lincoln is not going to evacuate Sumter and Pickens.

The telegrams that arrived daily from Washington certainly did nothing to create confidence. "Much activity to-day in the War and Navy Departments," the commissioners wired on April 3. "It is said the Minnesota, at Boston, has been ordered to the mouth of the Mississippi. Powhatan suddenly put in commission to sail next week. Four companies now here . . . ordered to New York. Report says these movements have reference to the San Domingo question."81 On the 4th they repeated that this expedition was headed for San Domingo. But, they warned, "all this fleet may now or hereafter be ordered to our coast; hence we would say strengthen the defenses at the mouths of the Mississippi."82 The 5th saw these preparations still in progress. A "formidable military and naval force" was involved, Toombs was informed. Statements that San Domingo was the destination might be true or might be a ruse, said the commissioners, plumbing the depths of uncertainty. "Having no confidence in the administration, we say, be ever on your guard . . . . The notice promised us will come at the last moment if the fleet be intended for our waters."83 On April 6 Walker ordered Beauregard to isolate Sumter completely. "The courtesies which have been accorded to the commander of that fortress have been . . . taken advantage of in some cases by persons whose object in visiting Fort Sumter was chiefly to obtain information of the state of our defenses, to be communicated to the Government at Washington."84 By this time it had definitely been concluded at Montgomery that an expedition to reinforce Pickens was then weighing anchor, and additional troops were called to Pensacola to meet it.85 In Charleston, the newspapers were full of the warlike preparations then going on in the North. The venerable dean of secessionists, Edmund Ruffin, wrote in his diary on the 6th that "everything seems to indicate some new and serious attempt to strike an unlooked-for blow on the C.S., either reinforcing the blockaded forts, or (as also rumored) to blockade the Mississippi River."86 At ten-thirty that night the commissioners wired Toombs that there had been.
No change in the activity of the warlike armaments mentioned yesterday. The rumors that they are destined against Pickens and perhaps Sumter are getting every day stronger. We know nothing positive on the subject, but advise equal activity on your part to receive them if they come. We have not yet been notified of the movement, but the notifications may come when they are ready to start.87
The Commissioners thought Justice Campbell got in touch with Steward and got a vague answer. Campbell accepted that Lincoln would notify Pickens before an relief attempt was made. Pickens was unknown.

In the face of a steady stream of alarming information, the commissioners decided to get in touch with Seward once again. On Sunday morning, April 7, they called on Campbell. At their request, the latter wrote Seward, described their anxiety, and recapitulated the assurances he had previously given them and which he had just repeated to the effect that prior notice would be given before any action was taken with respect to Sumter or Pickens. "But if I have said more than I am authorized," Camp- bell concluded, "I pray that you will advise me." As an answer he received an undated, unsigned note saying: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see; other suggestions received, and will be respectfully considered."88 Campbell digested this bit of ambiguity and then wrote the commissioners that he still believed Governor Pickens would be notified before an attempt was made to provision Sumter, but he no longer felt at liberty to say prior notice would be given of any change made at Fort Pickens. He then wrote Seward and informed him of what he had just told the Confederates.89
Without recognization and surrender of the forts, the Commissioners concluded 'If that answer was not satisfactory, they would "consider the gauntlet of war thrown down and close our mission."90"
At last Crawford and his colleagues were convinced that "a hostile movement is on foot and part of it sailed against the Confederate States." They so telegraphed Toombs, adding that they intended to notify Seward that their secretary would call at 2 P.M. the next day for an answer to their note of March 12. If that answer was not satisfactory, they would "consider the gauntlet of war thrown down and close our mission."90 The next morning, April 8, they wired the Charleston authorities that they had been told Sumter would not be supplied without notice, adding, however, that they placed no faith in these assurances; "the war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this hour."9' At 2:15 P.M. their secretary, John T. Pickett, called at the State Department. He was handed a blank envelope containing an unsigned memorandum which Seward had placed on file on March 15 when the commissioners agreed to defer their request for an answer. In it Seward refused to consider the Confederacy as an independent nation and declined to have any dealings with its alleged agents.92

This ends the diplomacy and my presentation. The Commissioners went to Washington with a demand for recognition or war and when that was not forthcoming, Davis initiated war. My reading of the record is that the CSA was overconfident boarding on arrogance in negotiation without much diplomatic skills. When the political situation changed from their ideal, they were unable to compensate.
Footnotes
88Oflicial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 258-59; copy of unsigned memorandum, dated Sunday morning, April 7, 1861, in Pickett Papers; Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, 340; Bancroft, Seward, II, 140-41n. By "other suggestions" Seward probably was referring to an offer by Campbell to go in person to Montgomery.
89Bancroft, Seward, II, 141n; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, IV, 36-37; Campbell to Crawford (copy), 2 P. M., April 7, 1861, in Picketit Papers.
900fficial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 258; original in the Pickett Papers. On the 7th Ruffin noted in his diary that telegraphic reports had been received in Charleston saying that "war steamers have been dispatched from Boston and New York, with 1800 soldiers to the South, but destination unknown." Ruffin, "The First Shot at Sumter," 71. 91Official Records, Series I, Vol. I, 289; Official Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 259.
920fficial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. IV, 259; memorandum by John T. Pickett in the Pickett Papers.
930fficial Records of the Navies, Series I, Vol. I, 259. The full text notice read: "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions and that if such attempt be not resisted no effort to throw in men, ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack the fort." Official Records, Series I, Vol. I, 291.
940ficial Records, Series I, Vol. I, 289.
 

jgoodguy

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CSA Today said:
You have to wonder the Confederate authorities' reaction when the Federal commander at Fort Sumter became convinced that Lincoln intended war.

Anderson's intercepted letter:

Current's commentary on the letter: “After an anxious night for Davis and his colleagues, Walker telegraphed to Beauregard the next morning, April 12: What was Major Anderson’s reply to the proposition contained in my dispatch of last night?” “The anxiety was lessened a little when the mail brought a fat envelope from Governor Pickens. No longer could there be the slightest doubt that the recent notice to the governor, purported from Lincoln, veritably had come from him. Here was proof. Governor Pickens enclosed letters which Anderson had dispatched to Washington but which the Confederate authorities had seized. In one of these letters, from Anderson to his superiors in Washington, he acknowledged receipt of the communication, telling him that an expedition was on the way to Sumter. “(It is just as well, for Anderson’s reputation in the North, that this letter did not get to Washington. In it, Anderson expressed surprise and chagrin. He predicted “most disastrous results” throughout the country. He went on to say: “my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced.” So wrote the man whom Northerners soon were to hail as the first hero of the war’s first battle!)”
Yes a man surrounded by cannons and angry men with band members under his care, under siege, armed boats patrolling just outside his commands, bonfires surrounded by men demanding his blood within sight , persistent demands for surrender might think a war would break out if the Lincoln dared to send bread to starving men, an affront to Southern honor after their inexperienced diplomats marched into Washington demanding independence, Sumter and Pickens or war; just might think a war was coming.
 

Andersonh1

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This is one of the few attempts I've seen to actually explore the Confederate side of the pre-war diplomacy attempt. It's an excellent article for digging into their mindset and what they believed was happening in Washington as they tried to open relations with the new administration.
 

Andersonh1

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The objectives of negation were incompatible. The CSA wanted independence or war. The Union wanted delay until cooler heads prevail which was not going to happen.
I disagree. The CS wanted peaceful independence. They did not start shooting until they felt backed into a corner with no other options, and when they believed the attack against them was literally at the door.
 

jgoodguy

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I disagree. The CS wanted peaceful independence. They did not start shooting until they felt backed into a corner with no other options, and when they believed the attack against them was literally at the door.
They had de facto independence, why then did they start a shooting war? A peaceful people would have waited to see what would happen. A people who demanded surrender or war would go to war.
 

jgoodguy

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How so? The new President of the United States had said in his inaugural that he didn't recognize that, and would carry on with business as usual.
Yes and so what? Lincoln has no real army nor navy. The South is calling up 100,000 volunteers and heavily armed forces surrounds both Sumter and Pickens. The instructions from the Davis Admin was independence, leave Sumter and Pickens or way.
 

jgoodguy

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IMHO There is nothing inherently wrong about the Southern positions of independence or war. Presenting the South as inherently peaceful and forced to war seems to me to be a fallacy.
 

Kirk's Raider's

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They all left town before litigation. Taney seems to be preparing a brief in favor of that. A number of legal eagles of the time thought secession was unconstitutional and coercion was also unconstitutional. I think that that interpretation might have been upheld by the Taney court. The attack on Fort Sumter changed that and Lincoln's position was that the States did not leave the union, but rebels took over their governments.

Looks like 4 see
[style size=18px;]Abraham Lincoln's Supreme Court[/style]

Campbell Alabama went South
Taney Maryland
Catron Tennessee
Wayne Georgia.
Not sure how the baby could be split and I am referring to a dispute that King Solomon proposed when two women argued over who was the biological mother of a baby and King Solomon offered to split the baby into two separate parts.
If secession is illegal but using force to prevent secession is illegal then secession is really not illegal.
Another analogy would be if you own a store and a thief grabs some items and runs towards the front door then what the thief does is ill but if you put hands in him to try to perform a citizens arrest for retail theft that to is illegal. If you use physical force to wrest the items away from the thief that to is illegal.
Kirk's Raider's
 

jgoodguy

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Not sure how the baby could be split and I am referring to a dispute that King Solomon proposed when two women argued over who was the biological mother of a baby and King Solomon offered to split the baby into two separate parts.
If secession is illegal but using force to prevent secession is illegal then secession is really not illegal.
Another analogy would be if you own a store and a thief grabs some items and runs towards the front door then what the thief does is ill but if you put hands in him to try to perform a citizens arrest for retail theft that to is illegal. If you use physical force to wrest the items away from the thief that to is illegal.
Kirk's Raider's
That is assuming too much IMHO. Secession is a political event not a legal one. If implictly or explictly the Northern States had let the Southern States go without war all the courts can do is handle the resulting mess. While secession is a gray legal area, attacking a US fort is not.
 

Kirk's Raider's

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That is assuming too much IMHO. Secession is a political event not a legal one. If implictly or explictly the Northern States had let the Southern States go without war all the courts can do is handle the resulting mess. While secession is a gray legal area, attacking a US fort is not.
No doubt about the attack. No doubt if the Union pulled up it's skirts and ran in terror from the secessionists then yes a Confederate nation emerges.
My main point how does one circle the square of " Secession is illegal but using force to prevent secession is illegal'?
Kirk's Raider's
 

jgoodguy

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No doubt about the attack. No doubt if the Union pulled up it's skirts and ran in terror from the secessionists then yes a Confederate nation emerges.
My main point how does one circle the square of " Secession is illegal but using force to prevent secession is illegal'?
Kirk's Raider's
The Constitution is silent on both secession and the response to secession. In peace time Lincoln has to get Congress to approve action and to get the Northern States to go alone.
 

Kirk's Raider's

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The Constitution is silent on both secession and the response to secession. In peace time Lincoln has to get Congress to approve action and to get the Northern States to go alone.
Apparently the secessionists feared that the Taney Scotus would not invoke an injunction against federal military force to suppress Secession. Lincoln had a constitutional right to suppress a rebellion and no federal court at any time invoked an injunction against use of force against the Confederacy.
So not sure what is actually meant by " force can't be used against Secession".
Kirk's Raider's
 

jgoodguy

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Apparently the secessionists feared that the Taney Scotus would not invoke an injunction against federal military force to suppress Secession. Lincoln had a constitutional right to suppress a rebellion and no federal court at any time invoked an injunction against use of force against the Confederacy.
So not sure what is actually meant by " force can't be used against Secession".
Kirk's Raider's
Exactly how is a force going to be used against seceding states? There is no constitutional procedure against peaceful secession in 1860. There are the militia acts and the insurrection act but do they apply outside of an armed event? Can a war in 1860 be declared without Constitutional approval in peacetime? Would Congress declare war in peacetime? Would Congress allocate funds for such a war? I cannot see it, it would be a unique unprecedented extraordinary exercise of power by a President. It is not likely the Taney Court would go along. Then would the Northern States who control the assembling of a military expedition go along?

IMHO By going to war, Davis solved all these issues for Lincoln.
 

Kirk's Raider's

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Exactly how is a force going to be used against seceding states? There is no constitutional procedure against peaceful secession in 1860. There are the militia acts and the insurrection act but do they apply outside of an armed event? Can a war in 1860 be declared without Constitutional approval in peacetime? Would Congress declare war in peacetime? Would Congress allocate funds for such a war? I cannot see it, it would be a unique unprecedented extraordinary exercise of power by a President. It is not likely the Taney Court would go along. Then would the Northern States who control the assembling of a military expedition go along?

IMHO By going to war, Davis solved all these issues for Lincoln.
If the secessionists had practiced something along the lines of passive resistance similar to Gandhi in India then yes Lincoln may of been in a bit of a legal dilemma. That would make a great " what if thread". Fortunately or unfortunately depending on on one's view point the Confederacy was as Don Dixon on CWT stated " to stupid to be a nation". Your right Davis in a historical sense was stupid and Gandhi was smart.
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rittmeister

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If the secessionists had practiced something along the lines of passive resistance similar to Gandhi in India then yes Lincoln may of been in a bit of a legal dilemma. That would make a great " what if thread". Fortunately or unfortunately depending on on one's view point the Confederacy was as Don Dixon on CWT stated " to stupid to be a nation". Your right Davis in a historical sense was stupid and Gandhi was smart.
Kirk's Raider's
how would a 'gandhi' fit into the mid-19th century usa - other than dead with tumbleweeds rolling around him, that is?
 
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