Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 464-465
Muddling on.
Commissioners were unhappy with the lack of former recognization.
An informal meeting was arranged at de Stoeckl's residence, Russian minister to the United States, but Steward declined at the last minute. The Commissioners felt that the Union would eventually surrender when faced with military action.
During the week that followed the March 22 conversations, the Confederate commissioners had little to report.66 The only incident of interest was a proposed meeting between Andre Roman, who probably joined his colleagues on the 17th or 18th, and Seward. In the course of a conversation between Baron Edo- ard de Stoeckl, Russian minister to the United States, and Seward, the latter reiterated his dedication to the cause of peace and asked de Stoeckl to arrange an informal meeting with Roman. e Stoeckl planned to invite both men to tea and then be called away on business, leaving them alone. The commissioners were undoubtedly greatly encouraged by this unexpected development, but they were soon disillusioned. On the morning of the 26th, the day of the proposed assignation (Seward's coquetry seems to deserve the word), de Stoeckl called on Roman and said he had received a note from Seward saying that he had thought the matter over and was afraid such a meeting would get to the newspapers; consequently 'he had to decline. This came as an "utter surprise" to the commissioners. Obviously intensely irritated, they wrote to Toombs requesting additional instructions and asking "whether we shall dally longer with a Government hesitating & doubting as to its own course, or shall we demand an answer at once [to our March 12 note]." Personally they would like to demand to be accorded the respect and dignity of the envoys of an independent nation. But, they went on, they realized the value of delay to the Confederacy. In the remainder of the letter, the commissioners expressed the opinion that the stronger the Confederacy made itself, the greater the possibility of recognition by the United States. They still believed Sumter would be evacuated, and advised Toombs to assemble a strong force at Pensacola and thus give Lincoln as good an excuse for evacuating Pickens as he had in the case of Sumter. The North would never risk war by reinforcing Pickens, but would only bluster and threaten in the newspapers. Then the commissioners contradicted themselves somewhat by saying they were assured they would be notified if the cabinet adopted a war policy, in effect admitting that the North might, after all, do more than write sulfurous editorials.6"
Meanwhile, Governor Pickens was still waiting for Lamon to come back and take away the Sumter garrison. Steward gave some excuses to placate the Commissioners who were reassured.
While the commissioners were fuming over Seward's fickleness, Governor Pickens was waiting for Lamon to come back to Charleston and take the Federal troops away, as he said he would. Finally on March 30 he telegraphed Crawford and the others and asked for an explanation.68 They gave the telegram to Campbell, who took it to Seward the same day. The Secretary said he could not give a definite reply to Pickens' telegram until Monday, April 1, but he went on to convince Campbell once again that Sumter was going to be evacuated. The purpose of Lamon's trip had been to gather information enabling Lincoln to demonstrate that evacuation was a military necessity. Lamon had not yet returned to Charleston because it was feared that surrendering the fort now might adversely affect the elections in Connecticut and Rhode Island, which were to be held on April 1 and 4.69 Campbell, with touching confidence in Seward's reliability, duly reported to the commissioners, who telegraphed a condensed version of the conversation to Toombs.70
Now it appears the story is that Lamon had no authority to make the assurances he did. Campbell was surprised. Now it appears that Sumter may be surprised, the Union is not going to surrender it. Be sure to read footnote 72
On April 1, however, when he called to receive an answer to Governor Pickens' telegram, Campbell was treated to a rude shock. Seward began by saying that Lincoln was disturbed at the contents of that telegram, because Lamon had no authority whatever to make any statement about Sumter, a fact which Lamon would confirm in person if Campbell so desired. The Secretary then jotted down a note for the commissioners which said "the President may desire to supply Fort Sumter, but will not undertake to do so without first giving notice to Governor Pickens."
Now the story is that Lincoln may or may not resupply Fort Sumter, but he will give notice. Judge Campbell notices that 4 times Steward said Sumter would be given up, now maybe not. Campbell tells Steward if the Union attempts to resupply Fort Sumter, an attack would result. Steward suggests that Lincoln is confused by many offers of advice. The last note says that Lincoln would not resupply Sumter without notice. A significant change in direction, but Judge Campbell was reassured. Judge Campbell was reassured and relayed this to the Commissioners.
The Judge was naturally taken aback. On at least four separate occasions during the last sixteen days Seward had said flatly that Sumter would be given up; now he was speaking of the possibility that it might be supplied. "What does this mean?" asked Campbell. "Does the President design to supply Sumter?" "No, I think not," was the reply; "it is a very irksome thing to him to evacuate it. His ears are open to everyone, and they fill his head with schemes for its supply. I do not think that he will adopt any of them. There is no design to reinforce it." But, Campbell persisted, even if that were true, it would still be a dangerous thing to speak to the Confederates of Lincoln's possible desire to supply the fort. It might be taken as an intention to do so, and lead to an attack on Sumter. Seward then said he would have to consult the President before answering. He left the room for a few minutes. When he returned he wrote out an answer for Governor Pickens which was somewhat different from his first note: "I am satisfied the Government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens."71 The only change-surely an unimportant one-was to omit any reference to Lincoln's "desire" to relieve the fort. Campbell accepted this message with the understanding that the assurances made on March 15 and reiterated on the 21st and 22nd were still valid.72
Footnotes be sure to read 73
67Crawford and Roman to Toombs, March 26, 1861, ibid.
68Connor, Campbell, 127; Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate 234-35.
69Crawford to Toombs, April 1, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
70Crawford and Roman to Toombs, March 30, 1861, ibid.
71Connor, Campbell, 127-28, quoting Campbell's account, "Facts of History." Naturally, no claim is made for the literal exactness of the quotation.
72Ibid., 128; Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, I, 235. [style color=#000080]On March 29, Lincoln ordered an expedition to be made ready for the purpose of supplying Sumter; on the 31st a similar decision was reached with respect to Pickens.
Seward was of course fully cognizant of both. On the same day that he talked to Campbell, April 1, Seward presented Lincoln with his memorandum, "Some thoughts for the President's consideration," in which he advocated surrendering Sumter and strengthening the Gulf forts.
Lincoln's reply of the same date said, among other things, that he had no intention of giving up Sumter. If this answer did not reach Seward before his talk with Campbell, he still may have had some hope at the time of that conversation that his policy might even then prevail. The fallacious explanation (see Stampp, And the War Came, 282-83) which Lincoln gave in his July 4 message to Congress to the effect that he had ordered the Sumter expedition to go ahead only after he had learned (on April 6) that his orders of 'March 11 to reinforce Pickens had miscarried probably was intended, among other things, to make Seward's friends think that the President had tried to follow his advice but had been thwarted by accidental circumstances.[/style] Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, III, 429-49; Lincoln, Collected Works, IV, 301, 315, 316-18n.