Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 454
Published by: Southern Historical Association Emphasis mine.

More walking and talking by SCOTUS justices.

After his conversation with Seward, Justice Nelson was walking down Pennsylvania Avenue and happened to meet Campbell. He told his colleague of his talk with the Secretary of State, and the two men went to Nelson's hotel to discuss the whole matter. They decided the welfare of the entire country would best be served if the Confederates were given a full opportunity to explain their mission. They were confident this could be done without recognizing the Confederacy in any way. Therefore they called on Seward that same day, the 15th, told him their conclusions and advised him to answer the commissioners' note and tell them that the government wanted nothing more than peace and was willing to make every effort to reach a friendly adjustment.
Seward heard them out and then replied, as Campbell recalled in later years,

I wish I could do it. See Montgomery Blair, see Mr. Bates, see Mr. Lincoln himself; I wish you would; they are all Southern men-convince them-no, there is not a member of the Cabinet who would consent to it. If Jefferson Davis had known the state of things here he would not have sent those Commissioners; the evacuation of Sumter is as much as the administration can bear.47
Seward's intrigue produces a statement that Sumter would be evacuated in 5 days. This will result in a monstrous misunderstanding later. OTOH Seward may have misunderstood Lincoln or was trying to defuse the situation for a little time. Or something else, he told Campbell something off the record but never related that to the commissioners then Campbell passes off Steward's personal opinion as fact.

"I had not before this had a hint of the proposed evacuation of Sumter," Campbell recorded, "and replied to Mr. Seward that I fully agreed with him that only one matter should be dealt with at a time and that the evacuation of Sumter was a sufficient burden upon the Administration . ". . . Feeling that the commissioners should be informed of this development, Campbell offered to tell them and also to write Jefferson Davis. Seward said he could inform the Southerners that Sumter would be vacated within five days, and that the government did not intend to make any changes with regard to the Gulf forts.49
Footnotes
46Robert Garlick Hill Kean, Inside the Confederate Government ... , Edward Younger, ed. (New York, 1957), 113.
47Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, 327-28; Connor, Campbell, 123-24. This particular quotation is from a letter Campbell wrote in 1873; it follows closely his account of the affair ("Facts of History") printed in full in Connor, Campbell, 122-32.
48Connor, Campbell, 124.
49Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, 328; Connor, Campbell, 124-25. No such decision had been reached, of course. Furthermore, Seward was almost certainly aware of Lincoln's order of March 11 to General Scott for the reinforcement of Fort Pickens, one of the Gulf forts. Stampp, And the War Came, 275; Bancroft, Seward, II, 148
 

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Link to Henry G. Connor, John Archibald Campbell, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, 1853-1861 (Boston, 1920), 122-126 Emphasis mine.

I said I would see the Commissioners on the subject and also write to Mr. Davis. What shall I say on the subject of Fort Sumter? He said: You may say to him that before that letter reaches him (How far is it to Montgomery?) Three days. You may say to him that before that letter reaches him the telegraph will have informed him that Sumter will have been evacuated. What shall I say as to the forts in the Gulf of Mexico? He said: We contemplate no action as to them; we are satisfied with the position of things there/ I agreed to see the Commissioners on that day, and to obtain their consent to a delay of their demand for an answer to their letter, and would afford him an answer. Mr. S. said he must have an answer that day, and if I were successful I might prevent a civil war.
Note the commission's summary of his purpose.
I called upon Mr. Crawford, one of the Commissioners, and informed him that I desired to write a letter to Mr. Davis; that I wished him to defer any call for an answer to his letter to Mr. Seward asking a reception or recognition of his public character until Mr. D. s reply was received. He objected. He said that the Commissioners had been sent to obtain a recognition from the United States and a peaceful settlement and if they could not have those that they would return to their people and that their people might know what they had a right to expect. I informed him of the contemplated action as to Sumter, of the probable continuance of affairs in the Gulf without alteration, and what the conditions might be of hasty or irritating action. After some discussion he consented to my request, provided I would assure him on the subject of Sumter, and he required my authority for my assertion, informing me at the same time that he was satisfied that it was Mr. Seward. I declined to give him any name and told him that he was not authorized to infer that I was acting under any agency; that I was responsible to him for what I told him and that no other person was. I informed him that Judge Nelson was aware of all that I knew and would agree that I was justified in saying to him what I did. I certified in writing my confident belief that Sumter would be evacuated in five days; that no alteration would be made in the condition of affairs in the Gulf prejudicial to the Confederate States; and that a demand for an answer to his letter to the Secretary would be productive of evil. He preferred to write the letter to Mr. Davis and consented to the requisite delay."I informed Mr. Seward of this the same day by letter and of the communication I had made. At the end of five days, Mr. Crawford called upon me to know why Sumter had not been evacuated.
 

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thomas aagaard said:
I think that was very naive considering that it is the duty of the president to make sure US laws are followed within the union.
Sure a weak president might have gone along with it and pushed the whole issue over to congress, but I do think that would be a cross dereliction of his duty.
IMHO the 80 years or so of the North giving into Southern demands produced an environment where they figured they could get it. With a CSA president figuring he was a war leader, the Southern honor social structure making them superior humans and it is easy to see how this happened.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 454
Published by: Southern Historical Association Emphasis mine.

A bit of a repeat of the Letter in post #46. Note that the letter on which this is based makes no reference to Judge Nelson verifying the information. Without Nelson's affirmation, we only have Campbell's version.

Later that morning Campbell went to Martin Crawford and told him that he was satisfied that Fort Sumter would be given up within five days and that there would be no change with respect to the Gulf forts. Giving up Sumter would impose a severe political strain on the administration, a strain which would be "injuriously increased by any demand for an answer to the communication of the commissioners of the Confederate States." He insisted that "an answer should not be requested until the effect of the evacuation of Fort Sumter on the public mind should be ascertained, and, at all events, that nothing be done for ten days."50 Crawford immediately guessed that Campbell came from Seward, but he was told by the judge not to assume that he was acting as anyone's agent; however, Justice Nelson could vouch for the accuracy of all that he had said.51 Crawford gave the impression of not wanting to agree to a delay, but finally consented (pending instructions from Montgomery) provided Campbell would write down his remarks and have Nelson verify them. This was done, and the result was the following note:
Message to Davis.

I feel perfect confidence in the fact that Fort Sumter will be evacuated in the next five days-and that this is felt to be a measure imposing vast responsibility upon the Administration.
I feel perfect confidence that no measure changing the existing status of things prejudicially to the Southern Confederate States is at present contemplated.
I feel entire confidence that any immediate demand for an answer to the communication of the Commissioners will be productive of evil & not of good.
I do not believe that it should be pressed. I earnestly ask for a delay until the effect of the evacuation of Fort Sumter can be ascertained-or at least for a few days, say ten days.
15 Mar 1861 (Signed) J. A. C.52

However look at this footnote suggesting over-optimism by Crawford. We do have Nelson's confirmation. Did Steward say that or did the justices hear that?

53Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, I, 232n. 5,Bancroft, Seward, II, 115n, gives Campbell's letter to Seward. A recent work, Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Improvised War, 1861-1862 (New York, 1959), 51n, states that Seward did not give a pledge that Sumter would be evacuated because (1) he did not have the power to do so and (2) Campbell's note only expressed the belief in the strong probability that the fort would be given up; he did not relay a "categorical promise" to that effect. It might be remarked that it is not necessary to possess the power to execute a pledge in order to give one; further, it was certainly not unreasonable of the commissioners to think that the Secretary of State did have the power to give such a pledge. Campbell did not speak in terms of "probability" but on the contrary used the phrases "entire confidence" and "perfect confidence," [style color=#000080]reflecting the words of Seward as understood by himself and Justice Nelson.[/style]
Footnotes
52Copy A, entitled Notes of Judge J. A. Campbell, accompanying Crawford, Forsyth, and Roman to Toombs, March 22, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
53Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, I, 232n.
55Dated March 15 and 16, respectively, in 'Pickett Papers.
56Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, III, 409; original in Pickett Papers.
 

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leftyhunter said:
Of the nine Supreme Court justices in 1861 how many were from the soon to be Confederate States and Southern border states. I know Taney is from Maryland. At any time prior to the firing on Ft.Sumter did the Secessionists file for an injunction to preclude the Federal government from using force to prevent Secession?
Leftyhunter
They all left town before litigation. Taney seems to be preparing a brief in favor of that. A number of legal eagles of the time thought secession was unconstitutional and coercion was also unconstitutional. I think that that interpretation might have been upheld by the Taney court. The attack on Fort Sumter changed that and Lincoln's position was that the States did not leave the union, but rebels took over their governments.

Looks like 4 see
[style size=18px;]Abraham Lincoln's Supreme Court[/style]

Campbell Alabama went South
Taney Maryland
Catron Tennessee
Wayne Georgia.
 

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The life of William H. Seward by Bancroft, Frederic, 1860-1945
Link
Yet another view of Seward's promise that Fort Sumter would be evacuated.
Based on this post from 2011 by @trice

P118-119 link Lincoln carefully avoided antagonizing Steward We have 3 questions to consider.

Until the last days of March, Seward's influence over the administration seemed to be undisturbed. Although Lincoln had not adopted his recommendations, he so carefully avoided direct antagonism to them that Seward and his friends—as well as Jefferson Davis1—continued to believe that they would prevail. What did the status at this time—near the end of March—indicate as to the efficiency of Seward's plan and methods if they should be allowed full sway? A fair point from which to judge them should be gained by a careful examination of these three questions
1. How did the Confederates regard and expect to meet his policy?
2. What conditions did the southern Unionists put upon its acceptance?
3. What did Seward's closest friends, and other Republicans, think of the outlook?
The Confederates considered themselves as in charge and able to bend the United States to their demands. IMHO this will generate anger that will influence Davis' reaction.

1. With profound complacency, the Confederates regarded Seward as their cat's-paw*. " I have felt it my duty under instructions from your department, as well as from my best judgment," Crawford wrote to Toombs,March 6th, " to adopt and support Mr. Seward's policy,upon condition, however, that the present status is to be rigidly maintained. His reasons and my own, it is proper to say, are as wide apart as the poles : he is fully persuaded that peace will bring about a reconstruction of the Union, whilst I feel confident that it will build up and cement our Confederacy and put us beyond the reach either of his arms or of his diplomacy." " It is well that he should indulge in dreams which we know are not to be realized," [style color=#000088]Forsyth and Crawford complacently said, two days later. Because the Confederates were living under their own laws and were levying tribute upon the North, the commissioners felt that a continuance of quiet would be most conducive to solidification of their government and to preparation for any emergency; while it would tend to' give them character,power, and influence abroad.1[/style] [style color=#000080]The evacuation of Forts Sumter and Pickens would be pro tanto** a recognition of independence.[/style] Obtaining Fort Pickens might be a work of time. " Still, invest the latter as Sumter was and it soon becomes a necessity." Crawford pointed out that,by procuring from Seward a pledge not to change the status, the Confederate States had won a great advantage, for they " were not bound in any way whatever to observe the same course toward it "—the United States." We think, then, that the policy of ' masterly inactivity,'on our part, was wise in every particular."2 As late as April 2d, the Confederate Secretary of State wrote to the commissioners: " It is a matter of no importance to us what motives may induce the adoption of Mr. Seward'spolicy by his government. We are satisfied that it will rebound to our advantage, and, therefore, care little for Mr. Seward's calculations as to its future effect upon the Confederate States." At the same time Toombsinstruct-ed the commissioners not to agree to maintain the presentstatus except upon the condition that the United States troops should be withdrawn from both Sumter and Pick-ens. From the beginning these forts were linked together for war or peace.3 This soon became apparent.
While the CSA refuses to change its laws to accomidate a peace effore it demands the US change its laws.
The commissioners had asked their government if during negotiations it would be practicable to collect the same duties as were required by the laws of the UnitedStates rather than by those of the Confederacy. March 14th, Toombs answered: " The government of the Confederate States can never agree that negotiations shall be made dependent on the nonexecution of our own laws. . . . Not even to avert war can we ever consent to suspend the operation of the laws which we are bound to execute."
Again the demand is for the Union to take no action say to resupply Fort Sumter while allowing the CSA the option to attack Fort Sumter or Fort Pickens at will.
In a separate despatch of March 29th Roman expressed hopes that Seward would, "before long, return to his idea of having an informal interview with us, and that some plan, not for a final treaty of peace—he dares not go so far—but for a truce or cessation of hostilities, perhaps until the meeting of the next Congress, may be agreed upon."
If the Confederates understood the needs of their own government, Seward's expectations were to be disappointed—unless he had some plan in reserve.


* a person who is used by another to carry out an unpleasant or dangerous task.
** to such an extent; to that extent.
1 Commissioners, March 26th.
2 Crawford to Toombs, April 1st.
3 On February 15th, a resolution of the Confederate Congress expressed the opinion " that immediate steps should be taken to obtain possession of Forts Sumter and Pickens, by the authority of this government, either by negotiations or force, as early as practicable."1 War Records, 258.
 

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The life of William H. Seward by Bancroft, Frederic, 1860-1945
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P120-121

Stewards friends advised giving into the Commissioners. Steward believed passionately that peace would result in the reconstruction of the Union. He was wrong. There was nothing suggesting that in reality.

2. John A. Gilmer, of North-Carolina, and George W.Summers, of Virginia, probably stood closer to Seward than any other Southerners, not Republicans. Gilmer indicated his belief that, in order to save the Unionists in the southern states from being " swept away in a torrent of madness," it would be necessary to withdraw the troops from all the fortifications in the Confederacy and leave the revenue laws unenforced, so as to avoid a resort to arms.1 He thought that most of the states could be won back in less than two years. LikewiseJudge Summers, in his great Union speech before the Virginia convention, maintained that there was neither cause nor power to retake the lost forts ; that there was no way for the United States to collect the customs in the seceded states ; that we were " bound to accept secession as an existing fact," for the seven states had" formed a new confederacy " and were " now performing the functions of an independent government."11

Footnotes
1 For Gilmer's letters to Seward, see Appendix L.
2 At the same time, he said he would regard that statesman as "narrow and unphilosophical" who should consider the action of these
Moreover, the report of the committee on Federal relations had already indicated that more than half the members of the convention were practically defensive allies of the Confederacy.1 Throughout March those who called themselves Unionists or conservatives held the immediate secessionists in check; but it was the task of Sisyphus, and every day the burden grew heavier. Not even one hint has been found, in the many letters, they wrote to Seward, that they would remain loyal if the Confederacy should be resisted. Lincoln's sarcasticexclamation—"Yes! your Virginia people are goodUnionists, but it is always with an if!"*—was a perfect characterization of their attitude. And, as a matter of fact, those whom Lincoln so accurately called Seward and Weed's "white crows" soon became Confederates. Yet Seward expected such broken reeds to be the southern pillars of the Union!
Footnotes 1 American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, 732-34.
2 1 Southern Historical Papers, 446.
 

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The life of William H. Seward by Bancroft, Frederic, 1860-1945
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P121-122
Reading the newspapers and listening to gossip, it appears that the Union is on the ropes making the CSA confident of victory, that one more push would do it. IMHO Steward would have surrendered.

3. The commissioners had frequently reported that the peace party at the North was growing. An editorial article in the New York Times of March 21st said that " there is a growing sentiment throughout the North in favor of letting the Gulf States go." Every week of quiet strengthened conservatives and abolitionists in the belief that it would be better to say, " Wayward sisters, depart in peace," than to risk the perils of a civil war. Neither the Times nor the EveningJournalaccepted this view, but both papers suggested that an extra session of Congress would be a prerequisite of adopting a policy of active resistance to secession.1 Gilmer urged Seward, March 12th, to draw up a proclamation throwing uponBuchanan's administration the blame for the condition of affairs. To this Seward replied that the suggestions were "judicious."2 There had been a verymarkedchangeof attitude since the previous winter when the EveningJournal denounced Buchanan for not pursuing a vigorous policy. The almost free-trade tariff of the Confederacy had so demoralized importation at the North that theTimes said, on March 30th: " With us it is no longer an abstract question—one of constitutional construction, or of reserved or delegated powers of the state or Federal government, but of material existence and moral position both at home and abroad." Douglas and most of the Democrats were known to be in favor of withdrawing the troops from both Sumter and Pickens, and recog-nizing as a fact what had taken place. The RepublicanSenators became more and more impatient, and Trum-bull finally introduced a resolution declaring that thetrue wayto preserve the Union was to enforce in all thestates the laws of the Union.3
1 la a very significant editorial article on "Peaceful Secession,"
March 23d, the Evening Journal said that there should be no shedding
of blood " by the general government, if it have not the needed force to
carry on the war which the shedding of blood would initiate." As late
as April 3d, a leading article in the Times said: "If he [the President]
decides to enforce the laws, let him call Congress together and demand
the means of doing it."
2 See Appendix L, letter of April 11th. a Globe, 1860-61, 1519.
 

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Confederate Veteran
based off of @trice post
Link
P447-448

A southern view

Treatment of Confederate Commissioners. On the 12th of March, 1861, eight days after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, the Confederate commissioners addressed a note to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, asking for an interview in order to have a conference for the purpose of adjusting all questions between the United States and the Confederate States government. To this request, no answer was returned at the time. But to Supreme Justice Nelson, of New York, who had come to protest against coercion as unconstitutional, Mr. Seward intimated that to receive the commissioners officially would be taken as an acknowledgment of the independence of the Confederacy, which the Northern people would not stand. Then Supreme Justice Campbell, of Alabama, was- asked by Justice Nelson to call with him on the Secretary, which they did, and the Secretary told them that the immediate recognition of the commissioners would not be sustained by sentiment at the North in connection with the withdrawal of troops from Fort Sumter, which had been determined on. When Judge Campbell proposed to write to President Davis the substance of the interview, Mr. Seward authorized him to say to Mr. Davis that before that letter should reach him the order for the evacuation of Fort Sumter would have been made. This was on March 15, 1861. Thenceforth the negotiations between the commissioners and Mr. Seward were through Judges Campbell and Nelson and turned on the evacuation of Fort Sumter as determining the question of coercion or peace, for all recognized that coercion meant war. [style color=#000080]Five days after the assurance of the Secretary that the fort should be evacuated there was evidence that it was being strengthened. Mr. Seward assured the commissioners, through Judge Campbell, that the delay in evacuation was accidental and did not involve the integrity of his assurance that the evacuation would take place.[/style]
On the 19th of March Mr. G. V. Fox, afterwards Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had a plan for the relief of Fort Sumter, went, with Mr. Lincoln's consent, to Charleston, where, on his arrival on the 21st of March, he obtained permission from Governor Pickens to visit Fort Sumter' "expressly on the pledge of pacific purposes." There he matured his plan for furnishing supplies and reinforcements to the garrison. He did not communicate his plan to Major Anderson, the commanding officer of the fort. He reported the result of his visit to Washington. His plan was approved by President Lincoln, and he was sent to New York to arrange for its execution. After a few days Colonel Lamon, another confidential agent, was sent by President Lincoln ostensibly to arrange for the removal of the garrison. On leaving he expressed hope to Governor Pickens of a speedy return for that purpose. He never returned.
Perfidity or bureaucracy plus Steward's personal plans.
On the 30th of March, after Colonel Lamon's departure, Governor Pickens wrote to the commissioners inquiring the meaning of the prolonged delay in fulfilling the promise of evacuation. This dispatch was taken by Judge Campbell to Mr. Seward, who answered on April 1, saying that "the government will not attempt to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens." Being asked by Judge Campbell if there had been a change as to the former communications, Mr. Seward answered, "None." Let it be borne in mind that all this occurred while Mr. Fox was making active, though secret, preparations for his relief expedition.
And War Came.

On the 7th of April, the commissioners becoming impatient, having heard of the projected relief expedition, Judge Campbell asked Mr. Seward whether the assurances so often were given were well or ill-founded. To this the Secretary returned an answer in writing: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see." At that time the relief expedition had already sailed from New York for Charleston ; for on the 8th of April Mr. Chew, an official of the State Department in Washington, delivered to Governor Pickens and to General Beauregard an official notification, without date or signature, that the attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumter. Mr. Chew said that this notification was from the President of the United States and was delivered to him (Chew) on April 6. The relief expedition, or squadron, consisted of eight vessels carrying twenty- six guns and fourteen hundred men, including troops sent to reinforce the garrison. It should have reached Charleston on the 9th, before General Beauregard could have prepared to receive it; but it was delayed by a tempest and was lying just outside of the harbor on the 12th of April when General Beauregard was bombarding Fort Sumter, which was surrendered after a gallant defense on the 13th of April, the garrison marching out with the honors of war.
 

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wbull1 said:
Seward, as we know now, was acting on his hopeful misinterpretation of the new Lincoln administration. He imagined if things remained peaceful that the southern states would want to return to the Union, which was another assumption based more on hope than on reality.
I see lots of assumptions, dashed with hurt feelings.
 

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wbull1 said:
I agree. I think also President Buchanan's foolish remarks essentially "You can't secede, but I can't do anything about it if you do" and his inaction gave a false impression that the Union would just allow the Confederacy to set up an independent nation.
that opinion was held by a lot of folks. I tend to agree with that assessment. It was never tested because open hot rebellion is war and war rules apply.
 

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wbull1 said:
I see the diplomacy as doomed from the beginning due to the absolute failure on each side to put themselves into the mindset of the opposite side. Even Stephen A. Douglas, long time national Democratic leader who spent years with southerner in his party, did not believe the south would secede. Threats had been made for decades before anything happened. On the southern side, Lincoln was an unknown and it was not clear to them who was in charge. Neither believed the rhetoric of the others.
The objectives of negation were incompatible. The CSA wanted independence or war. The Union wanted delay until cooler heads prevail which was not going to happen.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 454
Published by: Southern Historical Association Emphasis mine.

We have the CSA Commissioners playing Steward playing his game of unelected president. Something will have to give because Steward cannot deliver. It appears to me that Lincoln did not call Steward to heel until after Lincoln had made his mind up on what to do. This will cause a lot of CSA resentment and lead to war, but since their stated purpose was US surrender of sovereignty or war, the war was inevitable.

During his conversation with Crawford, Campbell made no effort to conceal the strategy underlying Seward's desire for delay-the belief that the Confederacy would "wither under sunshine." The Confederate said he was "willing to take all the risks of sunshine. "53
Campbell's next step was to write Seward and tell him what assurances had been given and that he need not worry about an immediate reply to the March 12 note being required by the commissioners.54 For their part, the commissioners telegraphed to Montgomery that
by pressing we can get an answer to our official note tomorrow. If we do, we believe it will be adverse to recognition and peace. We are sure that within five days Sumter will be evacuated. We are sure that no steps will be taken to change the military status. With a few days' delays a favorable answer may be had .... What shall we do?
The commissioners remained confident that Steward was correct that Sumter would be evacuated peacefully.
In reply Toombs told them to "wait a reasonable time and then ask for instructions."55 By March 20 the specified five days had elapsed and still there was no announcement that Sumter was being surrendered. Evidently worried at the lack of news, Toombs telegraphed the commissioners, "We can't hear from you."56 To this they replied, "You have not heard from us because there is no change. If there is faith in man we may rely on the assurances we have as to the status. Time is essential to a peaceful issue of the mission. In the present posture of affairs precipitation* is war. We are all agreed."
Footnotes
*Hurry.
55Dated March 15 and 16, respectively, in 'Pickett Papers.
56Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, III, 409; original in Pickett Papers.

It is starting to appear that something is wrong. Anderson not only is not evacuating, but he is strengthening Sumter. Campbell and Nelson take Beauregard's telegram to Steward and ask for an explanation. Steward assures them that everything is all right and the following afternoon Steward spoke with confidence of his ability to carry through his policy. The commissioners continued to regard Steward under their control and were reassured.

That same day they also wired Beauregard and asked if Anderson had evacuated Sumter or appeared to be about to do so. "Sumter not evacuated," Beauregard answered; "no indications whatever of it. Anderson working still on its defenses."57 Thereupon the commissioners asked Campbell to see Seward and find out what was the matter. Campbell and Nelson took Beauregard's telegram and went to the State Department on the 21st. They found Seward too busy for an extended conference, although he did take time to assure them that everything was all right and to make an appointment with them for the following afternoon. On the strength of the Secretary's remarks Campbell left a memorandum with the Crawford commission reaffirming his confidence that steps had been taken to evacuate Sumter and that no changes unfavorable to the South would be made at Fort Pickens. The Justices returned to the State Department the next day and found Seward "buoyant and sanguine"; he spoke with confidence of his ability to carry through his policy. He thought the delay accidental, and felt it did not involve the integrity of his assurance that the evacuation would take place, and that Campbell "should know whenever any change was made in the resolution in reference to Sumter or to Pickens." Campbell returned to the commissioners, brimming with hope, fully convinced that with prudence, forbearance, and wisdom, peace could be attained. On the strength of Seward's remarks, Campbell wrote another memorandum for the Confederates:
His confidence is not justified.
As a result of my interview today I have to say that I have still unabated confidence that Fort Sumter will be evacuated & that no delay that has occurred excites in me any apprehension or distrust. And that the state of things at Fort Pickens will not be altered prejudicially to the Confederate States. I counsel inactivity in making demands on this Government for the present. I shall have knowledge of any change in the existing status.
22d March 1861 (Signed) J. A. C.58
Footnotes
57Official Records, Series I, Vol. I, 277; Vol. ILIII, 136.
58Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, I, 233; Connor, Campbell,126-27; Copy B, entitled Notes of Judge Campbell, accompanying Crawford,Forsyth, and Roman to Toombs, March 22, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
 

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wbull1 said:
I don't think Seward was lying. I believe he thought and hoped he would be the "power behind the throne" in the Lincoln administration. He had not yet learned that when decisions were made it would be the president who made them.
I agree.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 461-462

The sentiment of the Commissioners is that the North will yield on Sumter and more concessions would follow. The Confederacy needed time to prepare, but as things work out IMHO the war-centric approach to the diplomacy will result in a war much earlier than needed to prepare.

Then, as on March 15, Campbell informed Seward in writing of what he had told Crawford, and the commissioners relayed the essence of this last note to Toombs by telegraph and added that they felt encouraged. Reporting at greater length by letter that same day, they emphasized that delay was the best policy. The Confederacy needed time to prepare for whatever the future might bring, and in the meantime the peace party in the North was steadily gaining in strength. Sumter had been a great trial to the administration, but once it was given up, other concessions would be easier to make.59

Back in Montgomery, some folks are becoming suspicious of the delay. A reiteration of give up the forts or else.

In reply Assistant Secretary of State William M. Browne wrote that President Davis approved their action in not pressing for an answer to their March 12 note, but then went on to show reasons why the intentions of the Lincoln regime should be regarded with skepticism. There were, for example, the failure to vacate Sumter within five days as promised, and the strengthening of the works at Fort Pickens. Furthermore the fact that the United States was preparing to abandon Sumter (and hold Pickens, a stronger position) [style color=#000080]only after Confederate power had made it militarily untenable, showed that Lincoln would yield only to superior force and cast serious doubt on his desire for peace[/style]. Therefore they should urge the evacuation of all the forts in the Confederacy within a reasonable time as "an indispensable condition to the preservation of peace" and as a prerequisite to pacific negotiations. They were also directed to inquire as to why a large number of United States naval vessels had been recalled from foreign stations and concentrated in Northern ports, and to say that the Confederate government had taken serious cognizance of this development.60
Indeed the suspicions were justified that the Union might not be as subservient as the Commissioners reported. Lincoln was formulating a plan of action.
Davis' suspicions were indeed well-founded. After two weeks of relative inaction, Lincoln was moving toward a decision. Gustavus Vasa Fox, later assistant secretary of the navy, had a plan
or the relief of Fort Sumter. At the instance of Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, an uncompromising coercionist, he came to Washington and laid the plan before the President. Fox was aware of the opposition in the cabinet to any such action, and he suggested that his arguments would be more convincing if he went to Sumter himself and examined the situation at first hand. Lincoln agreed. Fox arrived in Charleston on March 21 and looked up an old friend, Commander H. J. Hartstene, now of the Confederate navy. Hartstene was not able to locate General Beauregard, so he took Fox to Governor Pickens, who gave the Northerner permission to visit Sumter on the condition that his purposes were entirely peaceful.61 Hartstene accompanied Fox, and on his return, Beauregard asked, "Were you with Captain Fox all the time of his visit?" "All but a short period, when he was with Major Anderson," was the answer. "I fear that we shall have occasion to regret that short period," rejoined Beauregard.62
59Crawford, Forsyth, Roman to Toombs, Mareh 22, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
60Wifllim M. Browne to Crawford, Roman, and Forsyth, March 28, 1861, ibid.
61Offial Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (30 vols. and index, Washington, 1894-1927), Series I, Vol. I, 227, 246-47. It is scarcely possible that Fox did not understand this condition. He must have known that Confederate authorities would never allow him to visit the fort for the purpose of facilitating its relief.
62Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, 372n. Anderson and Fox did discuss the problems involved in relieving the fort. Anderson believed it was impossible and opposed making the attempt. Ibid., 371-72.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 462-463

Ward H. Lamon went to Charleston, taken as Lincoln's personal representative, which he did nothing to correct, made the impression that Sumter would be evacuated.
On the day of Fox's visit to Sumter, Lincoln explained to Stephen A. Hurlbut, then of Illinois but a native of Charleston, that he wanted him to go to South Carolina and gauge the strength of Unionist sentiment there-that sentiment Seward was counting on to react against secession, if given time. Accompanying Hurlbut was Lincoln's old friend, Ward H. Lamon, whom the Southerners took for Lincoln's personal emissary. Both men arrived in Charleston on the 25th. Hurlbut proceeded to confer with that unbending Unionist, James L. Petigru, under whom he had studied law. Lamon met Governor Pickens, went out to Sumter, and did a great deal of loose talking to the effect that he had come to Charleston to arrange with Anderson for the removal of his garrison.65 On the 26th Beauregard reported to Walker that "Mr. Lamon left here last night, saying that Major Anderson and command would soon be withdrawn from Fort Sumter in a satisfactory manner."64 After he had returned to Washington, Lamon wrote Pickens that he would be back in a few days to remove Anderson and his men.65 Lincoln disavowed Lamon's statements early in April, but the effect was to erode still further the already crumbling faith in Northern promises.
Footnote
63Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, III, 390; Official Records, Series I, Vol. I, 222.

From Page 390-391 of above reference. Link

By appointment I met Mr. Petigrn at 1 p. M. and had a private conversation with him for more than two hours. I was at liberty to state to him that my object was to ascertain and report the actual state of feeling in the city and State. Our conversation was entirely free and confidential. He is now the only man in the city of Charleston who avowedly adheres to the Union. . . From these sources I have no hesitation in reporting as unquestionable—that separate nationality is a fixed fact, that there is an unanimity of sentiment which is to my mind astonishing, that there is no attachment to the Union. . . There is positively nothing to appeal to. The sentiment of national patriotism, always feeble in Carolina, has been extinguished and overridden by the acknowledged doctrine of the paramount allegiance to the State. False political economy diligently taught for years has now become an axiom, and [style color=#000080]merchants and businessmen believe, and act upon the belief, that great growth of trade and expansion of material prosperity will and must follow the establishment of a Southern republic. They expect a golden era, when Charleston shall be a great commercial, emporium and control for the South, as New York does for the North[/style].
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 464-465

Muddling on.
Commissioners were unhappy with the lack of former recognization.
An informal meeting was arranged at de Stoeckl's residence, Russian minister to the United States, but Steward declined at the last minute. The Commissioners felt that the Union would eventually surrender when faced with military action.

During the week that followed the March 22 conversations, the Confederate commissioners had little to report.66 The only incident of interest was a proposed meeting between Andre Roman, who probably joined his colleagues on the 17th or 18th, and Seward. In the course of a conversation between Baron Edo- ard de Stoeckl, Russian minister to the United States, and Seward, the latter reiterated his dedication to the cause of peace and asked de Stoeckl to arrange an informal meeting with Roman. e Stoeckl planned to invite both men to tea and then be called away on business, leaving them alone. The commissioners were undoubtedly greatly encouraged by this unexpected development, but they were soon disillusioned. On the morning of the 26th, the day of the proposed assignation (Seward's coquetry seems to deserve the word), de Stoeckl called on Roman and said he had received a note from Seward saying that he had thought the matter over and was afraid such a meeting would get to the newspapers; consequently 'he had to decline. This came as an "utter surprise" to the commissioners. Obviously intensely irritated, they wrote to Toombs requesting additional instructions and asking "whether we shall dally longer with a Government hesitating & doubting as to its own course, or shall we demand an answer at once [to our March 12 note]." Personally they would like to demand to be accorded the respect and dignity of the envoys of an independent nation. But, they went on, they realized the value of delay to the Confederacy. In the remainder of the letter, the commissioners expressed the opinion that the stronger the Confederacy made itself, the greater the possibility of recognition by the United States. They still believed Sumter would be evacuated, and advised Toombs to assemble a strong force at Pensacola and thus give Lincoln as good an excuse for evacuating Pickens as he had in the case of Sumter. The North would never risk war by reinforcing Pickens, but would only bluster and threaten in the newspapers. Then the commissioners contradicted themselves somewhat by saying they were assured they would be notified if the cabinet adopted a war policy, in effect admitting that the North might, after all, do more than write sulfurous editorials.6"

Meanwhile, Governor Pickens was still waiting for Lamon to come back and take away the Sumter garrison. Steward gave some excuses to placate the Commissioners who were reassured.

While the commissioners were fuming over Seward's fickleness, Governor Pickens was waiting for Lamon to come back to Charleston and take the Federal troops away, as he said he would. Finally on March 30 he telegraphed Crawford and the others and asked for an explanation.68 They gave the telegram to Campbell, who took it to Seward the same day. The Secretary said he could not give a definite reply to Pickens' telegram until Monday, April 1, but he went on to convince Campbell once again that Sumter was going to be evacuated. The purpose of Lamon's trip had been to gather information enabling Lincoln to demonstrate that evacuation was a military necessity. Lamon had not yet returned to Charleston because it was feared that surrendering the fort now might adversely affect the elections in Connecticut and Rhode Island, which were to be held on April 1 and 4.69 Campbell, with touching confidence in Seward's reliability, duly reported to the commissioners, who telegraphed a condensed version of the conversation to Toombs.70
Now it appears the story is that Lamon had no authority to make the assurances he did. Campbell was surprised. Now it appears that Sumter may be surprised, the Union is not going to surrender it. Be sure to read footnote 72
On April 1, however, when he called to receive an answer to Governor Pickens' telegram, Campbell was treated to a rude shock. Seward began by saying that Lincoln was disturbed at the contents of that telegram, because Lamon had no authority whatever to make any statement about Sumter, a fact which Lamon would confirm in person if Campbell so desired. The Secretary then jotted down a note for the commissioners which said "the President may desire to supply Fort Sumter, but will not undertake to do so without first giving notice to Governor Pickens."
Now the story is that Lincoln may or may not resupply Fort Sumter, but he will give notice. Judge Campbell notices that 4 times Steward said Sumter would be given up, now maybe not. Campbell tells Steward if the Union attempts to resupply Fort Sumter, an attack would result. Steward suggests that Lincoln is confused by many offers of advice. The last note says that Lincoln would not resupply Sumter without notice. A significant change in direction, but Judge Campbell was reassured. Judge Campbell was reassured and relayed this to the Commissioners.
The Judge was naturally taken aback. On at least four separate occasions during the last sixteen days Seward had said flatly that Sumter would be given up; now he was speaking of the possibility that it might be supplied. "What does this mean?" asked Campbell. "Does the President design to supply Sumter?" "No, I think not," was the reply; "it is a very irksome thing to him to evacuate it. His ears are open to everyone, and they fill his head with schemes for its supply. I do not think that he will adopt any of them. There is no design to reinforce it." But, Campbell persisted, even if that were true, it would still be a dangerous thing to speak to the Confederates of Lincoln's possible desire to supply the fort. It might be taken as an intention to do so, and lead to an attack on Sumter. Seward then said he would have to consult the President before answering. He left the room for a few minutes. When he returned he wrote out an answer for Governor Pickens which was somewhat different from his first note: "I am satisfied the Government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens."71 The only change-surely an unimportant one-was to omit any reference to Lincoln's "desire" to relieve the fort. Campbell accepted this message with the understanding that the assurances made on March 15 and reiterated on the 21st and 22nd were still valid.72
Footnotes be sure to read 73
67Crawford and Roman to Toombs, March 26, 1861, ibid.
68Connor, Campbell, 127; Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate 234-35.
69Crawford to Toombs, April 1, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
70Crawford and Roman to Toombs, March 30, 1861, ibid.
71Connor, Campbell, 127-28, quoting Campbell's account, "Facts of History." Naturally, no claim is made for the literal exactness of the quotation.
72Ibid., 128; Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, I, 235. [style color=#000080]On March 29, Lincoln ordered an expedition to be made ready for the purpose of supplying Sumter; on the 31st a similar decision was reached with respect to Pickens. Seward was of course fully cognizant of both. On the same day that he talked to Campbell, April 1, Seward presented Lincoln with his memorandum, "Some thoughts for the President's consideration," in which he advocated surrendering Sumter and strengthening the Gulf forts. Lincoln's reply of the same date said, among other things, that he had no intention of giving up Sumter. If this answer did not reach Seward before his talk with Campbell, he still may have had some hope at the time of that conversation that his policy might even then prevail. The fallacious explanation (see Stampp, And the War Came, 282-83) which Lincoln gave in his July 4 message to Congress to the effect that he had ordered the Sumter expedition to go ahead only after he had learned (on April 6) that his orders of 'March 11 to reinforce Pickens had miscarried probably was intended, among other things, to make Seward's friends think that the President had tried to follow his advice but had been thwarted by accidental circumstances.[/style] Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, III, 429-49; Lincoln, Collected Works, IV, 301, 315, 316-18n.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 466

Steward told the Commissioners via Campbell what they wanted to hear. Their mission would be successful because Lincoln was a coward with no taste for war, their superiority to Northerners, and that the North had no stomach for war. They sent confusing dispatches to Montgomery. Steward IMHO would seem much less adroit had Campbell and the Commissioners not had a mindset that allowed preconceptions to cloud their judgment.

Not long after his conversation with the adroit Secretary of State, Campbell wrote President Davis that "I do not doubt that Sumter will be evacuated shortly, without any effort to supply it," and that he would be notified before any change was made at Fort Pickens. "So far as I can judge," he continued, "the present desire is to let things remain as they are, without action of any kind."73 Thus did he brush aside the plain implications of Lincoln's note and once again place his trust in the verbal statements of Seward. Reflecting this same point of view, Crawford wired Beauregard that he was authorized to say that no attempt to supply Sumter would be made without notifying Governor Pick- ens first. "My own opinion," he said, "is that the President has not the courage to execute the order agreed upon in Cabinet for the evacuation of the fort[!], but that he intends to shift the responsibility upon Major Anderson, by suffering him to be starved out."74 In a similar message to Toombs, the commissioners warned against attacking Sumter "when the general impression is, its surrender can be expected every hour." That would make the Confederacy appear "guilty of the unnecessary shedding of blood & it would tend to concentrate public opinion at the North in favor of this government.""5 With that statement, the commissioners made one of their rare accurate predictions of coming events. They had, as a matter of fact, no real knowledge of what was impending, and remained in a state of confusion, oscillating between extremes of optimism and pessimism. On the very next day after their hopeful dispatch of April 1 they telegraphed Toombs that the
war wing presses on the President; he vibrates to that side . . Their form of notice to us may be that of the coward, who gives it when he strikes. Watch at all points. It is said the Pawnee sailed from this place this evening with three companies of artillery.76

Footnotes
73Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, III, 411.
74Oflcial Records, Series I, Vol. I, 283-84.
75Crawford and Roman to Toombs, April 1, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
76Official Records, Series I, Vol. I, 284; original in Pickett Papers.
 
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