Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2204623 .
Accessed: 16/03/2014 04:02
A look at the diplomacy surrounding Fort Sumpter
THE DECISION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO PROVISION FORT SUMTER and the decision of the Confederate government to attack it have been the focus of one of the more persistent controversies of Civil War history. Claims that the South fired the first shot and thus unnecessarily began a bloody conflict have been countered by accusations that the attempt to supply the fort was a hostile act, the spark that really touched off the explosion. The part Lincoln himself played in the Sumter affair has, to say the least, attracted much attention. The most devastating and provocative charge thus far made, one which the late Professor Charles W. Ramsdell was the first to put forward in a complete and scholarly manner, is that Lincoln deliberately provoked the Confederates into firing the first shot as the only possible way out of an otherwise insoluble political dilemma.' This allegation is especially controversial because it is felt by many to challenge, if not overthrow, the most widely accepted picture of Lincoln's character.
I think the more likely explanation is that Lincoln gave the choice of war or peace to Davis giving Davis the initiative and Davis chose war. Lincoln was in a bind, there was unanimity in the North on how to proceed and the legal path was uncertain. War simplifies the situation for Lincoln and for Davis.
Preoccupation with the Lincoln side of the Sumter question has meant comparative neglect of the Confederate side. Writers have not taken the trouble to give a connected narrative of the Sumter negotiations as they were seen by the Montgomery government and its officials. Perhaps the fullest account is contained in Crawford's Genesis of the Civil War, but it is often unclear and sometimes inaccurate.2 Nicolay and Hay, in their massive biography of Lincoln, treat the subject at some length, but with venomous partisanship. And at best such works discuss it only as part of some larger story. Therefore a narrative confined to the diplomacy of Sumter as seen by the Confederate government should help to throw into sharper relief the reasons which led President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet to make that momentous choice which sent the first shell arching across Charleston Harbor.
Footnotes
'Charles W. Radsdell, Lincoln and Fort Sumter,"
Journal of Southern History,
III (August 1937), 259-88.
2Samuel Wylie Crawford,
The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter,
1860-1861 (New York, 1887).
3John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (10 vols., New
York, 1890), III-IV.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2204623 .
Emphasis mine.
The story of the Confederacy's Sumter diplomacy begins in mid-February 1861 when the new government at Montgomery assumed responsibility, previously borne by South Carolina, for the military situation at Charleston. Events prior to that time had done a great deal to alarm the people of the state and the South generally. Early in December, almost two weeks before South Carolina seceded, the congressmen of the state had talked with President James Buchanan and believed they had secured a pledge from him that the military status quo at Charleston would not be altered so long as Major Robert Anderson's garrison of Federal troops at Fort Moultrie was not disturbed. After secession, the state sent envoys to Washington to settle all outstanding questions between the United States and the new republic, but scarcely had they arrived when they heard that Anderson had moved his men from the weak Fort Moultrie on the mainland to the much stronger Fort Sumter in the harbor. This was interpreted as a warlike move anticipatory of hostilities and aroused great excitement in Charleston and elsewhere. Soon afterward, early in January, Buchanan attempted to send reinforcements to Anderson on the Star of the West, but it was fired on and driven off on January 9 without accomplishing its purpose. The result was naturally further bad feeling. These occurrences, coupled with the Carolinian temperament of that day-fiery, excitable, already indignant at the continued presence of foreign troops in the harbor-created a dangerous atmosphere. The people and their leaders were impatient; they wanted action. "If the meeting of the Convention at Montgomery," Governor Francis W. Pickens wrote Jefferson Davis on January 23, "can give us our rights and our possessions without blood, I shall rejoice, but if not, blood must follow."4 [style color=#2969b0]Statements of this sort created a fear in Montgomery that hostilities might be commenced unnecessarily, and at a time when the new Confederacy was yet too weak to defend itself. To prevent this, the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States passed a resolution on February 12 assuming full responsibility for the Sumter question.5 The threat of unilateral action by South Carolina never materialized, and Davis did, in fact, secure the co-operation of the state throughout the crisis. The unfortunate climax was not to be precipitated by any rash act of Charleston fire-eaters but rather by the deliberate and skillfully conceived policies of Abraham Lincoln.[/style]
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association P443-444
Recent scholarship has pointed out that Lincoln formed basic policy toward Sumter and related questions during the winter of 1860-1861, and that, keeping his own counsel, he managed to adhere to that policy in the face of many difficulties.6 Similarly, the basic strategy the Confederacy should follow had taken shape in Jefferson Davis' mind well before the Montgomery government was organized. On January 20 he wrote Governor Pickens that it would be unwise to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter.
The little garrison in its present position presses on nothing but a point of pride, and to you I need not say that war is made up of real elements. I hope we shall soon have a Southern Confederacy, that shall be ready to do all which interest or even pride demands .... We have much of preparation to make, both in military and civil organization, and the time which serves for our preparation, by its moral effect tends also towards a peaceful solution .... [If] things continue as they are for a month, we shall then be in a condition to speak with a voice which all must hear and heed.7
So the plan was, and would continue to be: Refrain from bringing on a crisis, even though the United States continued to maintain garrisons at Fort Sumter and elsewhere.8 Instead, be patient, consolidate and strengthen the new nation. T[style color=#2[b]9[/b]69b0]hen when the Confederacy demanded its rights it would have a better chance of receiving them peaceably or, if not, then a better chance of winning them by force of arms. To Davis, the latter eventuality seemed more probable; he was never optimistic about the possibility of peaceful separation.[/style]9
A single letter seems to be a bit sparse for defining Davis' strategy. Also in assuming war, then Davis would be predisposed to military action. Lincolns motives may also be sparsely documented.

Footnotes:
journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865
(7 vols., Washington, 1904-1905), I, 46-47.
6For a persuasive interpretation of Lincoln's actions, see Kenneth M. Stampp,
And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861 (Baton
Rouge, 1950), 178-286.
7Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist,

V, 40.
8The other forts still held by the United States were Pickens at Pensacola,
Taylor at Key West, and Jefferson at Dry Tortugas.
 

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Jimklag said:
Just opining that Davis could have used diplomacy more but instead pulled the trigger. It was not meant to send the thread off the rails.
The article will disclose he did more diplomacy than we have discussed before. I suspect I will found wrong on some of my posts. One reason we are exploring this in the new year. New things to learn.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association P444-445

On February 19 Davis was inaugurated as President of the Provisional Government, and during the next few days, he was occupied in forming his cabinet.
Meanwhile, on February 15 Congress passed a resolution advising Davis to appoint a three-man commission to be sent to Washington "for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations between [the United States] and the Confederate States of America; and for the settlement of all questions of disagreements between the two Governments, upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith." Immediately thereafter another resolution was adopted saying

It is the sense of this Congress that immediate steps should be taken to obtain possession of Forts Sumter and Picken by the authority of this Government, either by negotiation, or force, as early as practicable, and the President is hereby authorized to make all necessary military preparations for carrying this resolution into effect.'5
Davis ignores for the moment this resolution which has no practical effect. And concentrates on the commission. The Commission has wide-ranging practical powers. However, Congress has not appropriated funding for and settlements. Treaties also have to be approved by the Senate.

Davis complied with the first resolution and selected for this vital duty Martin J. Crawford, Andre B. Roman, and John Forsyth. They were given sweeping powers to discuss and sign treaties or conventions dealing with all matters of common interest.'6 Crawford, head of the delegation, was a Georgian who had served creditably in Congress for a number of years. In 1861 he was in the prime of life (forty-one), a man of energy and determination, but, in the opinion of one astute observer, perhaps not of the best judgment.'7

I wonder how Crawford will figure into the failure of the mission.

Footnotes
l4Rembert W. Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet (Baton Rouge, 1944),
113-14.
'5Journal of the Confederate Congress, I, 55.
D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of
the Confederacy, Including the Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861-1865 (2 vols.,
Nashville, 1905), I, 56.
17'Russell,
Diary, 63; R. P. Brooks, "Martin Jenkins Crawford," Dictionary of
American Biography, IV, 523; Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Con-
federate Government (2 vols., Richmond, n. d.), I, 202.
18Russell,
Diary, 63, 66, 190-91.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association P447

The commissioners were instructed
* See the President of the United States
* Explain the peaceful intentions of the Confederacy.
* Secure, if possible, recognition and a treaty of amity.
* If he refused to accept their credentials and meet them officially, they should offer to discuss these matters with him unofficially.
* They were to assure him that hostilities would result only if the North tried to exercise the erstwhile powers of the Federal government within the frontiers of the Confederate States.
* If the President should state that he must delay any decisions until he could consult the Senate, or until Congress convened and took action to meet the crisis, the commissioners were empowered to acquiesce in such delay-provided they received assurances that the peaceful status quo would not be disturbed and that the United States would not try to enforce any presumed authority within the Confederacy.
It was least important to maintain the Status Quo.
It was very important to be suspicious.
These instructions were a recipe for misunderstanding as we shall see.
The commissioners were instructed by their government to see the President of the United States, explain the peaceful intentions of the Confederacy, and secure, if possible, recognition and a treaty of amity. * If he refused to accept their credentials and meet them officially, they should offer to discuss these matters with him unofficially. * They were to assure him that hostilities would result only if the North tried to exercise the erstwhile powers of the Federal government within the frontiers of the Confederate States. * If the President should state that he must delay any decisions until he could consult the Senate, or until Congress convened and took action to meet the crisis, the commissioners were empowered to acquiesce in such delay-provided they received assurances that the peaceful status quo would not be disturbed and that the United States would not try to enforce any presumed authority within the Confederacy. Toombs impressed upon his agents that it was of the "last importance" to preserve the status quo. Furthermore, they were warned to be on the lookout for any attempt by the United States to use delay "to cover sinister designs and complete a plan of military or naval attack, while we, in fancied security, wait for action" in the diplomatic sphere. Therefore they should do their best to get reliable information of the intentions of the United States and pass that information on to Montgomery regularly and frequently.21
Footnote
21 Toombs to Crawford, Forsyth, and Roman, February 27, 1861, in John T. Pickett Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association P447

Just as the CSA emerges from the chaos of secession and becoming a nation it runs into the chaos of a change of administration in Washington.

Crawford was the first commissioner to reach Washington, arriving there late on the morning of March 3. The political situation seemed little short of chaotic. Buchanan, with only one day of official life remaining, refused to receive Crawford, who described the President as being "as incapable now of purpose as a child." As for Lincoln, he was being driven to distraction by swarms of frantic officeseekers who would inevitably make the opening of negotiations more difficult.22
Chaos, pessimism, rumors, different cultures, vague phraseology, and suspicion. Not a great beginning for this diplomatic mission.
The Confederates firmly believed they had legally succeeded and were an independent nation, they had no doubt of this and Federal meddling would be met with force.

On the next day Lincoln was inaugurated, and in his address he stated his intention to "hold, occupy, and possess the property, and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion-no using of force against, or among the people anywhere."23 This was the kind of phraseology which could mean all things to all men-a Lincoln specialty- depending on their points of view. To the Confederates and their sympathizers in Washington, it was not reassuring. Their reaction was described by Lucius Quinton Washington, who was on intimate terms with the commissioners and who later became chief clerk in the Confederate State Department.24 Taking the pessimistic and suspicious attitude which was to be characteristic of him throughout the Sumter crisis, he wrote to Secretary of War Walker on March 5:
I was present last evening at a consultation of Southern gentlemen, at which Messrs. Crawford, Garnett, Pryor, De Jarnette, of Virginia, and Wigfall, of Texas, were present. We all put the same construction on the inaugural, which we carefully went over together. We agreed that it was Lincoln's purpose at once to attempt the collection of the revenue, to re-enforce and hold Fort Sumter and Pickens, and to retake the other places. He is a man of will and firmness. His Cabinet will yield to him with alacrity, I think. Seward has, of course, agreed to the inaugural, and the pretenses of his conservatism are idle. We believe that these plans will be put into execution immediately. I learn five or six United States ships are in New York Harbor, all ready to start.25


Footnotes
22Crawford to Toombs, March 3, 1861, ibid.
23A-Abraham Lincoln, Collected Works, Roy P. Basler, ed. (8 vols. and index,
New Brunswick, N. J., 1953), IV, 266. In the original draft of the inaugural,
Lincoln used franker words: "All the power at my disposal will be used to reclaim the public property and places which have fallen .... " The substitution was the suggestion of Orville Hickman Browning; 'Seward also advised him to tone down
the language. Ibid., IV, 254n, 261-62n.
24For additional information on Washington, see Robert Douthat Meade,
Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate Statesman (New York, 1943), 246, and Mary
Boykin Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, Ben Ames Williams, ed. (Boston, 1949),
passim.
25The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies (127 vols. and index, Washington, 1880-1901),
Series I, Vol. I, 263. On the previous day Washington -and Louis T. Wigfall had wiredGovernor Pickens that the inaugural meant war and that Sumter would soon be reinforced. Washington's March 5 letter was relayed to the Charlestown authorities
on March 9. Ibid., 272. See, also, Washington's telegram to Governor
Pickens, March 4, 1861, in Francis W. Pickens Papers ('Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress), in which he wrote, "The inaugural is regarded by all as equivalent
to a declaration of war.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association P447

Adding to the chaos is Seward, who fancied himself at the real president. His interference with the CSA diplomatic mission will lead to distrust and is a major factor in Davis' decision to start a war instead of waiting.

Such was true in 1860, when Seward was passed over in favor of Lincoln. Nevertheless, he continued to be, with the President himself, one of the leading figures in his party. He was offered and accepted the post of secretary of state, and it was expected by many that he would be president in fact if not in name, a hope which Seward himself seems to have shared for several weeks.26 Occupying the position he did in the Republican party and in Lincoln's cabinet, Seward tried to take charge of relations with the Confederacy, especially in connection with the crisis developing on the Sumter question.
Because the South had threatened to secede for so long, it was discounted the time it happened.

It had long been a standard practice with the Republicans, Seward included, to belittle Southern threats to secede; but the secession of South Carolina in December, followed by the rest of the lower South, made these presumably idle threats a reality.27 How was this danger to the party and the Union to be met? Seward believed the answer lay in patience and in avoiding anything which might provoke hostilities. Follow this policy, and the secessionist fever would steadily recede like mercury in a thermometer. Excitement would die out in the upper South, which would thereafter firmly adhere to the Union. A conservative reaction would then occur in the lower South, thereby undoing the work of the secessionists and reconstructing the Union on its original basis. To carry out this policy Seward would have to control the actions of both sides. It was, to say the least, a difficult undertaking, and ultimately the entire situation was to slip from Seward's grasp when Lincoln decided to supply Fort Sumter. But Seward's efforts, even though unsuccessful, are significant because they involved him in protracted negotiations which not only did not prevent war but which convinced the Confederates that the assurances and pledges of the Lincoln administration could not be trusted.
Footnotes
26Frederic

Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (2 vols., New York, 1900),

II, 7.
27Ibid., 1-2.
2sibid., 25-26.
 

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Greywolf said:
The instructions to the commissioners seem reasonable to me, seems they mostly wanted to talk and keep the status quo. Am I missing something?
[url=https://civilwartalk.com/goto/post?id=1959361][url=https://civilwartalk.com/goto/post?id=1959361]jgoodguy said:[/url][/url]
Toombs impressed upon his agents that it was of the "last importance" to preserve the status quo.
[url=https://civilwartalk.com/goto/post?id=1959361][url=https://civilwartalk.com/goto/post?id=1959361]jgoodguy said:[/url][/url]
They were to assure him that hostilities would result only if the North tried to exercise the erstwhile powers of the Federal government within the frontiers of the Confederate States.
[url=https://civilwartalk.com/goto/post?id=1959361][url=https://civilwartalk.com/goto/post?id=1959361]jgoodguy said:[/url][/url]
Furthermore, they were warned to be on the lookout for any attempt by the United States to use delay "to cover sinister designs and complete a plan of military or naval attack, while we, in fancied security, wait for action" in the diplomatic sphere.
Because the CSA believed it was an independent nation, there was no question of secession. It seems to me that the options were recognization or war.
 

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Greywolf said:
I agree with the first part of your response. They did believe they had seceded lawfully. As to the 2nd part, seems to me they were hoping to avoid war if possible.
If you can get a nation without war who wouldn't. Nevertheless, Status Que was not the objective.

In addition, they are not going to get foreign recognition without recognition from Washington.
 

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leftyhunter said:
Secessionist movements gain foreign recognition if other nations see it as being in their interest to do so. The Confederacy could never quite sell foreign recognition to any nation.
There was no diplomatic solution to Ft.Sumter. Either ships have to pay tariffs for importing goods into the United States or they don't. If they don't have to then the United States recognizes Confederate Independence. Either the United States has the right to garrison troops on it's own Territory or it does not because it recognizes the Confederacy.
President Lincoln had a stark and simple choice either recognize Confederate Independence or not.
Has Lincoln stated before the election " a divided house can not stand".
Davis is caught in the same bind. Either ships entering Charleston pay a tariff to the United States or they do not.
An independent Confederate nation can not allow foreign troops on it's soil . Some political issues simply can be settled by negotiations.
Leftyhunter
Link

Southern story-teller Jerry Clower tells of a coon hunt with Marcel Ledbetter, best coon hunter on earth....
One night Jerry and Marcel were out with their dogs when they treed a coon up a huge sycamore. Marcel, a firm believer in giving a coon a fighting chance, climbed the tree to shake the coon out. But it wasn't a coon, it was a lynx, and it went after Marcel something terrible. The tree was a-shakin' and a-quiverin' from the battle. Marcel was getting torn up. Finally, desperate, he hollered down at Jerry, "Shoot, shoot, this thang is killin' me." Jerry hollered back, "I'm afraid to shoot, I might hit you". Marcel hollered back down, "Just shoot up here amongst us, one of us has got to have some relief."
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 441-477
Published by: Southern Historical Association
Emphsis mine.

Steward is not going to give the Confederates independence, he wants to delay until the political situation in the South changes in favor of the Union. That is in conflict with the Confederate desire for a quick decision by the Federal Government, if not a decision by Lincoln, a decision by Congress shortly. Their desire is for independence, not an indefinite delay.

Here Steward without consulting Lincoln starts his game.

Late in February Seward took one of his first steps toward conciliating the Confederates. He saw to it that Jefferson Davis was told that the appointment to the cabinet of Salmon P. Chase, feared by Southerners as a strong coercionist, would not affect the peaceful intentions of the incoming administration.28 Soon after Lincoln's inauguration Seward was informed that a Confederate agent, Crawford, was in Washington and would ask immediately for an official interview and, if he were rebuffed, the impact on Southern opinion would probably force Davis to attack Forts Sumter and Pickens. [style color=#000080]At this early stage of the negotiations, it was the Confederate strategy to appear impatient of all delay in order to frighten the Lincoln government into an early recognition of the new nation.[/style] It was probably on March 5 that Seward talked with the pro-Southern William M. Gwin of California. According to Crawford, to whom Gwin evidently reported, the Secretary of State tried to be reassuring. He explained away the seemingly threatening parts of the inaugural and left the impression that Lincoln did not comprehend the seriousness of the crisis and would have to be taken in hand by such experienced statesmen as himself and Secretary of War Simon Cameron.29
Note that Steward apparently told the commissioners his plan. That is not exactly the stuff of a master politician or manipulator of nations.
This conversation was relayed to Secretary of State Robert Toombs on March 6 by Crawford, who had been reinforced the previous day by Commissioner John Forsyth. The Confederates had no illusions as to the motives underlying Seward's peaceful policies. In a dispatch of March 8 Crawford and Forsyth represented him as saying,
I have already whipped Mason and Hunter in their own state [Virginia]. I must crush out Davis and Toombs and their colleagues in sedition in their respective states. Saving the border states to the Union by moderation and justice, the people of the cotton states, unwillingly led into secession, will rebel against their leaders, and reconstruction will follow.30

Lincoln would later find out that there is little sentiment to return to the Union, but Steward was almost arrogantly confident. For a moment Steward and the Commisioners welcomed delay.

But since Seward's strategy coincided with the [style color=#000080]Confederate policy of gaining time to prepare for any eventuality,[/style] the Southerners were willing to co-operate with him. They were confident that the conservative reaction he anticipated would never materialize, certainly not in the lower South.
 

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MattL said:
I wanted to dig up the source referenced in that footnote:
----
21 Toombs to Crawford, Forsyth, and Roman, February 27, 1861, in John T. Pickett Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
----

Image 28 of Confederate States of America records: Microfilm Reel 1
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss16550.001/?sp=28

It begins here, I've also attached these files for reference

I see the instructions you outlined. To try to be accepted officially.. though if not

----

----

----

----

I didn't find much else of interest in there, as usual a long diatribe of how the Confederate states had every right to unilaterally secede. The only other interesting thing was Toombs seems to go on about how US policy is to be quick to accept newly formed National governments. His example seems to be how quickly the US accepted was seems to be the Second French Republic in 1848. I thought it interesting that he drew a comparison to a revolution as an argument for accepting their government, very different than many apologists these days that avoid the concept of "revolution" being comparable to their alleged legal unilateral secession.
Thanks for finding them and posting them!!
 

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Jimklag said:
JG, as much as I've read about him, I've never deciphered Seward's political motives. Initially, he wanted to be Prime Minister with Lincoln as head os state like the English parliamentary monarchy. But Lincoln slapped that idea down in a big hurry. Was Seward's behavior during the secession crisis part of his "Prime Ministerial" campaign?
IMHO he wanted to be president but he had too much political baggage to be president. Lincoln likely was chosen because he had no political experience and had done not anything for anyone to object to. Steward apparently thought Lincoln would have the title, but he would be the real president. He got fooled, but also misled the Commissions.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 451
Published by: Southern Historical Association
Emphasis mine.

Looks like a threat of recognition or war. Lots of demands from the Commissioners.

So Seward wanted time, which for him meant the commissioners should not press for recognition; the commissioners also wanted time, which for them meant leaving the military status quo undisturbed. Therefore the latter tried to extort a pledge to that effect. They sent word, probably by Gwin, that if necessary they were willing to face the possibility of war and would not consent to delay the fulfillment of their mission unless they were given unequivocal guarantees that the military situation would not be changed. Seward protested, but the commissioners remained firm. Finally, it was agreed that Gwin would present the Secretary with a written statement of the pledges the Confederates required before they would agree not to demand immediate recognition.

The commissioners felt encouraged, but the Home Office wanted assurance of Sumter's and Pickens evacuation as soon as possible.

Crawford and Forsyth were much encouraged; Seward's signature on such a paper would not only win the delay they sought but would constitute virtual recognition of the commission as representatives of an independent nation. They prepared a memorandum in which they agreed to allow their mission to remain in abeyance for twenty days, provided they were given a binding pledge that the Lincoln administration would do nothing whatever to change the military situation in the South. Gwin delivered this memorandum to the State Department the morning of March 8 but was told that Seward was at home ill. The commissioners suspected a ruse on the part of their wily antagonist, but upon careful investigation, they were satisfied that he really was sick.31 This temporary setback did not dampen their optimism, and on March 9 they sent telegrams to Toombs reporting that "the impression prevails in Administration circles that Fort Sumter will be evacuated within ten days," and warning that the Confederacy should "by all means avoid collision at Charlestown until you hear from us[.] Things look better here than was believed in Montgomery %..32 By the 11th Toombs evidently had a general idea of what was afoot, and he telegraphed to his agents, "Can't bind our hands a day without evacuation of S[umter] and P[ickens]."3 He was to enlarge on this point several days later in a written dispatch.

Seward had returned to his office on that same day. Gwin had left town, and so the commissioners asked Senator R. M. T. Hunter of Virginia to take their memorandum to the Secretary and request for them an informal interview. When Hunter presented himself at the State Department, Seward was visibly disconcerted. He seemed, wrote the commissioners, "to apprehend the formal presentation of the issue we have in charge." As for an interview, Seward said he would first have to consult Lincoln, and on the next day Hunter was handed a note from the Secretary saying it was not in his power to grant an interview."

So the immovable object of the US government stopped the irresistible force of the Commissioners to get an immediate advantage at Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens or quick recognization.

Footnotes.
31Forsyth and Crawford to Toombs, March 8, 1861, in Pickett
Papers; Bancroft,Seward, II, 111; Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, 323.
32Forsyth and Crawford to Toombs (two telegrams), March 9, 1861, in Pickett
Papers; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, IIII, 400.
33Toombs to Forsyth and Crawford, March 11, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
 
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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 452
Published by: Southern Historical Association
Emphasis mine.

The commissioners became impatient. Crawford arrived in the chaos of administration change on March 4, now it is March 11. 7 days of bureaucratic confusion and inertia and they are very impatient to be recognized as a country.

The Confederates abandoned their policy of delay. Their instructions from Toombs allowed them to consent to delay only if the United States promised not to disturb the status quo, and no such promise had been forthcoming. Furthermore, they were tired of playing Henry at Canossa, waiting for some gracious word to issue from the State Department.
We deemed it not compatible with the dignity of our Government to make a second effort [to be received] Our only remaining course was plain, and we followed it at once in the preparation of a formal note . . . informing the United States Government of our official presence here, the objects of our mission, and asking an early day to be appointed for an official interview.35
More delay ensued

This note was left at the State Department on March 13 by John T. Pickett, the commission's secretary. He called for an answer at noon the following day and was informed by Assistant Secretary of State Frederick W. Seward that his father had been very busy and the answer was not yet prepared. He promised, however, to send a reply very soon to the National Hotel, where the commissioners were staying. Still, it did not come, and Pickett went to the State Department again on the 15th and was told by the chief clerk that an answer was then in preparation.36

The Commissioners became overly optimistic. If the North underestimated the South dedication to secession, the South underestimated the North's dedication to Union. Aparently the Commisisoners made some vague threats.

While he and his colleagues were waiting for Seward's reply, John Forsyth gave Secretary of War Walker an account of the commission's strategy:
We are feeling our way here cautiously. We are playing a game in which time is our best advocate, and if our Government could afford the time I feel confident of winning. There is a terrific fight in the Cabinet. Our policy is to encourage the peace element in the fight, and at least blow up the Cabinet on the question. The outside pressure in favor of peace grows stronger every hour.37 Lincoln inclines to peace,...[style color=#000088]They believe, and we encourage the pleasant thought, that in case of war their precious persons would not be safe in Washington.[/style] With prudence, wisdom, and firmness we have the rascals "on the hip."38


Footnotes.
34Bancroft, Seward, II, 112.
35Nioloay and Hay, Lincoln, III, 402. For the contents of the note, see Richardson (ed.), Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, I, 84.
36Memorandum by John T. Pickett, March 14, 1861, in Pickett Papers.
37This belief in a growing peace element in the North was one of the worst miscalculations the Confederate commissioners made. On the contrary, steadily increasing pressure was being brought to bear on Lincoln to do something decisive. See Stampp, And the War Came, 265-70.
380fficial Records, Series IV, Vol. I, 165. According to ibid., Series I, Vol. I, 275, Forsyth sent a telegram to Governor Pickens on the 14th saying he thought a messenger had been sent to Anderson the previous day with orders to evacuate the fort. In the Pickens Papers, however, this telegram bears the date of the 15th, which is undoubtedly correct.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 454
Published by: Southern Historical Association Emphasis mine.

The assumption of the commission was that the CSA was an independent nation. War for independence seems to be the default position.

The actions of the commissioners up to this point received the qualified approval of President Davis. He had received with misgivings the proposed twenty-day delay in asking for recognition. It was, he thought, an "extremely doubtful policy." [style color=#000080]It seems likely that Davis, who tended to be excessively legalistic in his approach to such problems, preferred to have the duration of any period of delay based upon constitutional considerations (such as the time required to consult the Senate). This was the sort of excuse an independent nation could accept without loss of dignity, whereas the twenty-day period was arbitrary and based on political expediency.[/style] Nevertheless, in the interests of peace, the commissioners were told, Davis consented to the arrangement. But they were not to agree to an extension except as a matter of "extreme necessity, and unless negotiations are actually pending." [style color=#2969b0]On the other hand, if the Lincoln administration wanted to postpone a decision until the Senate could be consulted or until Congress assembled, that would be acceptable-but only if a "definitive arrangement" was made for the evacuation of Fort Sumter, which was called the "sine qua non" of peaceful negotiations.[/style] Furthermore, the commissioners were to demand "pertinaciously" the evacuation of Fort Pickens, and were to "urge" the surrender of Fort Taylor at Key West.39

The commissioners seem to be ordered to threaten war to get Lincolns acquiesence.
The CSA is assuming it is a sovereign country, even though no one recognized as such.

The next important news received by the Confederate State Department was that the projected agreement with Seward had fallen through and the commissioners had sent a formal note requesting an interview. Davis strongly approved their course. After waiving all diplomatic etiquette, they had been rebuffed; now they were quite properly standing on their dignity as the envoys of a sovereign nation.40

Now the commissioners are going to demand the Surrender of Fort Sumter as a condition of peace. Was this designed to force sn "unstable and irresolute administration" to yield or are Southern thinking along the lines of Lincoln up to some sinster purpose.

It is obvious from Toombs' telegram of the 11th and the dispatch of the 14th that Davis had modified his strategy. In their February 27 instructions the commissioners were told that, if Lincoln asked to postpone negotiations until he could secure the advice of the Senate or until Congress assembled, they were empowered to consent, provided guarantees were given that the military situation would not be changed in the interim. Now the condition for consenting to delay was the surrender of Sumter-or at least an "arrangement" for its surrender. In the February 27 instructions, Toombs had emphasized the great importance of
maintaining the status quo, yet an understanding to secure this for at least twenty days was received coolly in Montgomery. It is possible that this sterner attitude was designed to increase pressure on an unstable and irresolute administration, force it to give up Sumter, and thus eliminate the outstanding source of friction between the two governments. [style color=#2969b0]It seems more likely, however, that Davis and Toombs were afraid Lincoln might be using delay to cloak some sinister purpose.[/style]
All sort of rumors about.
Among the conflicting reports filtering down from Washington was one suggestion that a naval expedition was being fitted out for some unknown purpose. On the 14th Walker wired Confederate military commanders that four steamers were "ordered to sail from New York last night. Said to carry arms, provisions, and men. Destination not known."

TThe author seems to pick the most favorable assumption about Davis' actions, the evidence may, in turn, support a more warlike attitude by Davis too.

On the next day he warned Beauregard at Charleston to "give but little credit to the rumors of an amicable adjustment. Do not slacken for a moment your energies, and be ready to execute any order this Department may forward."'4 In view of these fears of a surprise attack, Davis probably decided the wisest course was to force a decision on Lincoln and thus discover his intentions. Davis himself was anything but optimistic about what the future held. ". . . I have not been of those who felt sanguine hope that the enemy would retire peaceably from your harbor," he wrote Governor Pickens on March 18. "It is his choice as to how he will go, his stay must soon be measured by our forbearance. To have Fort Sumter uninjured is important to us, and for that reason, if there were no other we should prefer that he should go peaceably."42
Footnotes
39Toom'bs to Crawford and Forsyth, March 14, 1861, in Pickett Papers. Davis was willing for the question of Fort Jefferson at Dry Tortugas to be left to later negotiations. He would also allow, during the twenty days, the Sumter garrison to purchase limited quantities of supplies "needful for the comfort of the officers and men," the amount and nature to be determined by the military authorities at Charleston.
40Toombs to Crawford and Forsyth, March 20, 1861, ibid. Davis was also probably concerned lest the Confederacy lose face in the eyes of foreign diplomats in Washington. This dispatch reaffirmed the instructions given in the dispatch of March 14.
410ficial Records, Series I, Vol. I, 263, 275-76.
42Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, V, 61.
 

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Fort Sumter and Confederate Diplomacy
Author(s): Ludwell H. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 454
Published by: Southern Historical Association Emphasis mine.

More players enter the game. I agree with Nelson's analysis that States cannot be coerced back into the Union without a war. However, the attack on Fort Sumter will provide the war. Nelson will dissent in the Prize Cases arguing that only Congress has the power to declare war. It was too late for moderation and compromise to reconstruct the Union.

Meanwhile, back in Washington the negotiations had reached a definite turning point. Had Seward been forced to reply to the Confederate commissioners' formal request for an interview at this time, he would have been compelled to refuse; Lincoln was never willing to do anything even remotely implying recognition. But as it turned out, Seward did not have to refuse to see the commissioners on March 15, thanks to the intervention of two members of the United States Supreme Court. Associate Justice Samuel Nelson had been giving serious study to the question of coercing the seceded states. He had concluded that coercion could not be carried out unless serious violence was done to the Constitution and existing laws, and, further, that war would in all probability ensue. On the other hand, he believed moderation on the part of the Federal government would result in reconstruction of the Union.
Steward believes that if recognition is not given to the South, war will result.

On March 15 Nelson tried to impress his views on Secretary of the Treasury Chase, Attorney General Edward Bates, and Seward, who as might be expected, was most cordial. As Nelson expounded the obstacles in the way of coercion, Seward said he was glad there were so many obstacles in the way of war; he only wished there were more.43 Seward went on to tell Nelson how awkward for him was the recent Confederate demand for recognition, the answer to which was still undelivered. He would spare no effort to preserve the peace, but, if he were forced to refuse the commissioners' request, war might be the result
Campbell was not a disinterested Observer. He was a Southern sympathizer possible a Confederate agent who would go South after Fort Sumpter to serve the CSA.(A)

Here Nelson suggested that Associate Justice John A. Campbell of Alabama, whose views coincided with Nelson's, might be able to help. This widely esteemed gentleman was destined to have the vital role of intermediary during the rest of the negotiations. As the secession crisis had developed, Campbell had shown himself wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of peace; to him all other questions were secondary. As early as January he had communicated with Lincoln through Montgomery Blair in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the President-elect to make a statement to calm public opinion. At the request of prominent Southerners he had also persuaded Jeremiah S. Black, then Buchanan's secretary of state, to try to get from Seward some reassuring statement as to Lincoln's policy which he could relay to his anxious friends from the South.45

Campbell was unhappy with the Lincoln inaugural because of his Southern bias. Someone, possibily Steward told him it was mere rhetoric.

When Lincoln himself set forth his policy in his inaugural, Campbell regarded it as a virtual declaration of war and prepared to resign from the Supreme Court. He was dissuaded from doing so by Joseph Holt,45 who brought soothing word, apparently from Seward, that the inaugural had served its purpose, did not really represent the policy of the government, and would be forgotten.46 Campbell relented. From a strictly personal point of view, he made a mistake in staying on; in the weeks to come he was to find little else than disappointed hopes and undeserved abuse.



Footnotes.
A. According to John G. Nicolay, one of Lincoln's private secretaries and a later biographer of him, "Failing in this direct application, they made further efforts through Mr. Justice Campbell of the Supreme Court... who came to Seward in the guise of a loyal official, though his correspondence with Jefferson Davis soon revealed a treasonable intent."Nicolay, John (1903) A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln pg. 183.
43Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, 326 (from an account written by Campbell in 1873).
44Henry G. Connor, John Archibald Campbell, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, 1853-1861 (Boston, 1920), 11-17, 140; Crawford, Genesis of the Civil
War, 345.
45Holt was secretary of war under Buchanan and retained his office for a short time
after Lincoln's inauguration.

Linkee The genesis of the Civil War: the story of Sumter, 1860-1861
 

jgoodguy

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MattL said:
That footnote and other content you shared

----
According to John G. Nicolay, one of Lincoln's private secretaries and a later biographer of him, "Failing in this direct application, they made further efforts through Mr. Justice Campbell of the Supreme Court... who came to Seward in the guise of a loyal official, though his correspondence with Jefferson Davis soon revealed a treasonable intent."Nicolay, John (1903) A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln pg. 183.
----

Is interesting. Does anyone have access to Campbell's correspondence with Davis, if not I might have to dig it up.

Seward, the commissioners, and others seem to be he typical human pattern of hearing what they want to hear. They all might have been using each other, stalling for time, playing the soft game to gain some ground in some negotiation (I certainly am starting to feel that more than Seward being some master of deception, especially with the involvement of Campbell). Though depending on the accuracy of the tone of that footnote I'm starting to wonder if Seward was surrounded on multiple fronts by people trying to manipulate him for the Confederate cause. Starting to wonder if he truly was manipulated in this scenario rather than the typical reversal of that where he somehow is the manipulator. I suspect those correspondences might be relevant.
Reference was
A short life of Abraham Lincoln : Nicolay, John G is the source but no footnotes.
See what you can find.
 
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