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Somerville directly tackles the issue of author Jay Luvaas’ influence on the historiography of European interpretations of the American Civil War experience. The opening pages of Bull Run to Boer War address the American historian Jay Luvaas’ thesis that British military professionals initially expressed interest in military developments in the United States in the 1860s, but quickly switched focus to the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars that led to the establishment of modern Germany. Luvaas did note that one significant British military theorist, G.F.R. Henderson did study the civil war, and exert influence over a generation of British officers training at the Staff College in the late nineteenth century. Henderson’s efforts, Luvaas contended, while extensive gave too much weight to the operations of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in the eastern theater and thus did not cover organizational, doctrinal, or operational developments in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, student officers did not make a systematic study of Henderson’s work, but rather absorbed only enough to pass competitive examinations for Staff College matriculation
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By analyzing Luvaas’ correspondence with Liddell Hart, Somerville determined that Liddell Hart greatly influenced Luvaas’ assumptions and research about how the British Army considered the Civil War, the conclusions drawn and the impact of those conclusions on British military thought. Somerville’s own research illustrates that British neither shunned study of the American Civil War nor misunderstood the lessons its lessons. Rather, they looked at the war in a broader context of the defense needs of Britain’s Imperial Empire, observations gleaned from the wars of continental European powers, and the rapidly evolving technological landscape of the late 19th century. Somerville paints a picture of a thoughtful, professional officer corps who viewed the Civil War with an eye to trying to discern trends that would influence the future of warfare. He concludes with the observation that British officers learned a great deal regarding the development of tactics, doctrine, and material from a study of the Civil War but missed the larger strategic concepts governing how to fight a large, prolonged land war. He attributes this lapse to 19th century Britain’s strategic position that focused on naval supremacy for home defense, short overseas expeditions to maintain the Imperial Empire and a focus on diplomacy to maintain the balance of power in Europe.